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Article 
Standing Voting Instructions: 
Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor 
Jill E. Fisch† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Institutional investor voting is a hot topic. Academics debate 
the efficacy of institutional activism.1 Issuers malign the voting 
behavior of institutions that blindly follow the recommendations 
of proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) and Glass Lewis.2 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and the Department of Labor (DOL) caution in-
stitutional investors that voting the shares of their portfolio com-
panies is a fiduciary responsibility.3 
 
†  Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
I am grateful for thoughtful feedback from Chuck Callan and Steve Norman, 
and to Broadridge for providing me with access to its retail and institutional 
voting platforms. Early drafts of this paper were presented at the University of 
Pennsylvania Ad Hoc Faculty Workshop, the UC Berkeley Faculty Workshop, 
the AALS Section on Securities Regulation, the 2017 UC Berkeley/University 
of San Diego Workshop, and Navigating Federalism in Corporate and Securities 
Law at Tulane Law School. I received many helpful comments at each session. 
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 1. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (offering em-
pirical evidence about the effects of shareholder activism on long-term firm 
value); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic 
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 449 (2014) (questioning the hypothesis that empowering activist share-
holders will increase long-term shareholder value). 
 2. See, e.g., Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advising 
Firms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t-Sponsored En-
ters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 5–6 (2013) (written testimony 
of Darla C. Stuckey, Senior Vice President of Policy & Advocacy, Society of Cor-
porate Secretaries and Governance Professionals), http://financialservices 
.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba16-wstate-dstuckey-20130605.pdf (de-
scribing reports from issuers that their investors follow proxy advisor recom-
mendations without questioning them). 
 3. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (discussing Department 
of Labor Avon letter  and SEC rulemaking). 
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In contrast, no one cares very much about retail investor 
voting.4 With institutional investors holding a growing percent-
age of publicly traded shares,5 the limited propensity of retail 
investors to vote their shares,6 and the economic cost of reaching 
out to individual investors to solicit their proxies, the retail vote 
has been all but forgotten.7 
The ability of retail investors, if engaged, to have a mean-
ingful effect on the outcome of a shareholder vote is one reason 
to reconsider this approach.8 The 2015 proxy contest at DuPont 
offers an example. In a closely-contested election in which hedge 
fund activist Trian nominated four candidates for the DuPont 
board, DuPont emerged victorious.9 Although many large insti-
tutional investors, as well as the major proxy advisory firms, 
 
 4. See Frank G. Zarb Jr. & John Endean, Restoring Balance in Proxy Vot-
ing: The Case for “Client Directed Voting,” HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 14, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/02/14/ 
restoring-balance-in-proxy-voting-the-case-for-client-directed-voting (observing 
that “the absence of retail investor participation” is an ignored “fundamental 
defect” in corporate proxy voting). But see Daniel M. Gallagher, Opening State-
ment at the Proxy Voting Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 19, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/opening-statement-proxy-voting 
-roundtable-gallagher.html (expressing particular interest in hearing “if there 
are ways in which the Commission can improve retail shareholder participation 
in the proxy process”). 
 5. John Endean, The Untapped Power of Individual Investors, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-endean-the-untapped-power 
-of-individual-investors-1412543380 (quoting BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATER-
HOUSECOOPERS, 2014 PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 2 (2d ed. 2014), http:// 
proxypulse.broadridge.com/proxypulse/assets/docs/broadridge-pwc-proxypulse 
-2nd-edition-june2014.pdf (stating that institutional investors own 70% of the 
shares of U.S. companies)). 
 6. See BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PROXY SEASON 
PREVIEW 3 (1st ed. 2015), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge 
-PwC-ProxyPulse-1st-Edition-2015.pdf (reporting that retail investors vote only 
29% of their shares, while institutional investors vote 90%). 
 7. See James McRitchie, Retail Shareholder Proxy Participation: Part 2 – 
CDV, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
4-681/4681-4.pdf (“In the 1940s and 1950s thousands of [retail] shareowners 
frequently showed up for shareowner meetings.”). 
 8. See, e.g., BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2016 PROXY SEA-
SON PREVIEW 3 (1st ed. 2016), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/ 
ProxyPulse-First-Edition-2016.pdf (“Data continues to show that engagement 
of the retail investor base can play an instrumental role in the outcome of a 
shareholder meeting.”). 
 9. See Jacob Bunge & David Benoit, DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board 
Fight, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont 
-appears-poised-to-win-over-peltz-1431521546. 
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supported some or all of the Trian slate, none of Trian’s nomi-
nees was elected.10 According to both Nelson Peltz and DuPont 
CEO Ellen Kullman, DuPont’s victory was due, in part, to the 
support of its retail investors.11  
A second reason to reconsider the importance of retail inves-
tor voting is the virtual elimination of discretionary broker vot-
ing.12 Prior to 2010, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 452 
permitted brokers to cast votes on most issues with respect to 
shares that they held as custodians if they did not receive voting 
instructions from the beneficial owner.13 The NYSE gradually 
narrowed the scope of this discretionary voting authority.14 By 
January 2012, brokers were barred from exercising discretion-
ary voting authority with respect to uncontested director elec-
tions, say-on-pay, and charter and bylaw amendments.15 Now, 
with respect to all of these issues, if shareholders do not provide 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Jeff Mordock, Retail Shareholders Cited as Key to DuPont’s Victory, 
DELAWAREONLINE (May 13, 2015), http://delawareonline.com/story/money/ 
business/2015/05/13/trian-rebuffed-dupont-slate-wins-seats/27226613. See also 
Ronald Orol, Why DuPont Beat Nelson Peltz in the Biggest Proxy Fight in Years, 
THESTREET (May 20, 2015), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13158047/3/why 
-dupont-beat-nelson-peltz-in-the-biggest-proxy-fight-in-years.html (quoting 
Bruce Goldfarb, CEO of proxy solicitor Okapi Partners, stating that the vote by 
retail investors was “possibly a real factor in the decision”). 
 12. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (describing the process 
by which NYSE reduced the scope of discretionary broker voting). 
 13. NYSE Rule 452, 1996 WL 34424015, 1. The rule authorized discretion-
ary broker voting for so-called routine issues. See also Order Approving NYSE 
Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Elec-
tion of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. 33293, 2 n.7 (July 1, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf (explaining the scope of Rule 452, prior to the 
2009 amendments). Thus, brokers were not allowed to vote uninstructed shares 
with respect to matters such as proxy contests or mergers. Id. at 5 n.14 (listing 
non-routine matters under Rule 452). 
 14. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. Previously, in 2003, the 
NYSE amended Rule 452 to ban discretionary voting with respect to approval 
of equity compensation plans. See Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed 
Rule Changes Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-48108 1, 7 (June 30, 2003) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 34-
48108], https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48108.htm. 
 15. Memorandum from NYSE Regulation to all NYSE & NYSE Amex Eq-
uities Members & Member Orgs. (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.nyse.com/ 
publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/rule-interpretations/2012/12-4.pdf (explaining 
that these subjects “going forward will be treated as ‘Broker May Not Vote’ mat-
ters” under NYSE Rule 452). 
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their brokers with voting instructions, their shares will not be 
voted at all.16 
A final, and perhaps most important, reason to provide re-
tail investors with a meaningful opportunity to vote their shares 
is to preserve the legitimacy of shareholder voting in reducing 
managerial agency costs and maintaining director accountabil-
ity.17 Recent regulatory changes and the rise of shareholder ac-
tivism have made shareholder voting power increasingly im-
portant.18 Shareholders today vote on a growing range of issues, 
such as executive compensation19 and shareholder-nominated 
director candidates.20 Recent developments in Delaware corpo-
rate law provide that director decisions that have been approved 
by an informed shareholder vote are largely insulated from judi-
cial oversight.21 Yet current voting outcomes do not reflect the 
preferences of all shareholders. Currently, 91% of institutional 
shares are voted, but voting turnout by retail investors averages 
less than 30%.22  
 
 16. Shares for which a broker has not received voting instructions are typ-
ically called broker “non-votes.” LATHAM & WATKINS, CLIENT ALERT: RECOM-
MENDED PROXY DISCLOSURE FOR DIRECTOR ELECTIONS AND OTHER PROPOSALS, 
4 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-recommended 
-proxy-disclosure. As long as there is at least one routine matter being voted on 
at the shareholders meeting—such as the ratification of the auditing firm—bro-
ker non-votes may be counted toward a quorum. Id.  
 17. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which 
the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of 
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897–901 (2013) (explaining how activist shareholders 
are able to leverage their power by attracting the voting support of more passive 
institutional investors). 
 19. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Par-
achute Compensation, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9178; 34-63768, 1 (Apr. 4, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf (adopting amendments 
to the Rules providing for shareholder approval of executive compensation). 
 20. See, e.g., SKADDEN, PROXY ACCESS: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2016 PROXY 
SEASON (June 28, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/sites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2 
Fpublications%2FProxy_Access_Highlights_of_the_2016_Proxy_Season.pdf 
(describing the increasing adoption of proxy access provisions that enable share-
holders to nominate director candidates on the issuer ’s proxy statement). 
 21. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 
2015) (rejecting a challenge to a merger where the merger had been approved 
by a fully informed shareholder vote). 
 22. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2017 PROXY SEASON RE-
VIEW 2 (Sept. 2017), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-2017-
proxy-season-review.pdf. 
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Low retail turnout allows institutional investors to domi-
nate election results,23 but there are reasons to believe that re-
tail investor voting preferences differ systemically from those of 
institutional investors. According to at least some commenta-
tors, retail investors are more likely to support management24 
and to vote in favor of executive compensation plans.25 These dif-
ferences matter. Although institutional investors hold the ma-
jority of voting stock of publicly traded companies, retail share-
holders own enough shares to make a difference; in many cases, 
a voting threshold of 20% to 30% can have a critical effect on the 
issuer.26 In addition, regardless of whether retail shareholders 
 
 23. See Matt Egan, Just 27% of Investors Bother To Vote, CNN MONEY 
(June 12, 2014), http://buzz.money.cnn.com/2014/06/12/shareholders-dont-vote 
(stating that poor turnout by retail investors means “their voices are being 
drowned out by large institutions on hot-button issues”); Dominic Jones, Did E-
proxy Figure in Apple’s Surprise Say-on-Pay Loss?, IR WEB REPORT (Mar. 5, 
2008), http://www.irwebreport.com/20080305/did-e-proxy-figure-in-apples 
-surprise-say-on-pay-loss (“Low retail turnout has the effect of amplifying the 
votes of institutional activist investors.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Mary Ann Cloyd, How Well Do You Know Your Shareholders?, 
HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 18, 2013), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/18/how-well-do-you-know-your-shareholders 
(“Retail shareholders support management’s voting recommendations at high 
rates.”); See Neil Stewart, Retail Shareholders: Looking Out for the Little Guy, 
IR Magazine (May 15, 2012), https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/ 
shareholder-targeting-id/18761/retail-shareholders-looking-out-little-guy (re-
porting that retail investors are more likely to support management than insti-
tutions). But see BRUNSWICK GROUP, A LOOK AT RETAIL INVESTORS’ VIEWS OF 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND WHY IT MATTERS (July 2015), https://www 
.slideshare.net/Brunswick/retail-investors-views-of-shareholder-activism 
-summary-of-results (reporting, based on results from a survey of 801 retail in-
vestors, that the majority believe activists add long-term value, and may thus 
be more likely to support activists than generally thought). 
 25. See BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 8, at 2 
(“Among the companies that failed to attain majority shareholder approval for 
executive compensation plans, retail investors cast 66% of their votes in favor 
of these plans while institutions cast 65% of their votes against.”); David Bo-
goslaw, Retail Investors Seen as Key to Firms Struggling on Say-on-Pay, Says 
ProxyPulse, IR MAGAZINE (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/ 
proxy-voting-annual-meetings/19800/retail-investors-seen-key-firms 
-struggling-say-pay-says-proxypulse (stating that retail investors showed 
greater support for say-on-pay plans than institutional investors). 
 26. See Proxy Voting Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 100–02 (Feb. 
19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable/proxy-voting-
roundtable-transcript.txt [hereinafter 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable] (provid-
ing Alan Beller ’s comments stating that retail is important now because of with-
hold vote campaigns, in which directors who get less than 70% support can wind 
up leaving the board); Id. at 91 (providing Reena Aggarwal’s comments stating 
that “twenty to thirty percent dissent votes can make a big difference”). 
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vote differently from institutional voters, voting results should 
convey the views of all shareholders. 
Although there are many plausible reasons for the low vot-
ing rate among retail investors,27 the mechanics of the voting 
process are likely a substantial factor. Institutional investors 
can vote their stock easily and inexpensively.28 ISS and other 
third party services provide voting platforms that enable insti-
tutions to authorize the voting of their shares in advance—either 
in accordance with customized voting guidelines or in accordance 
with a proxy advisor or management recommendation—and to, 
in essence, automate the voting process.29 Retail investors have 
no such option and must submit separate voting instructions in 
connection with each shareholder meeting through a process 
that is cumbersome in many cases is not directly linked to an 
investor’s brokerage account, and provides no mechanism for 
creating across-the-board instructions or voting policies.30 It is 
little wonder that the level of retail voting is low and continues 
to fall.31 
In addition to disenfranchising retail shareholders, the fact 
that, on average, 20% of shares are unvoted may disserve issu-
ers.32 As Scott Hirst has observed, low turnout may prevent is-
suers from making governance changes that are supported by 
both boards and shareholders, due to their inability to obtain the 
necessary vote threshold.33 The problem arises because share-
holder approval of many issues requires support by a majority or 
 
 27. See, e.g., Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Share-
holders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 57–
87 (2016) (attributing low voting rates by retail investors to rational apathy). 
 28. See Endean, supra note 5 (highlighting the efficient features of institu-
tional voting). 
 29. See infra notes 62–73 and accompanying text (describing the process by 
which market providers and intermediaries facilitate the institutional voting 
process). 
 30. See generally Zarb & Endean, supra note 4 (stating that the voting pro-
cess is “simply more burdensome” for retail investors than it is for institutions). 
 31. See Egan, supra note 23 (“A paltry 27% of retail investor shares were 
voted during the fall 2013 proxy election season. That’s even worse than the 
turnout in U.S. political elections—57.5% of eligible U.S. citizens participated 
in the 2012 presidential election.”). 
 32. See Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 102 (2017) 
(finding a median turnout of 81% in director elections for Russell 3000 compa-
nies). 
 33. See id. at 112–16 (discussing proposed amendments to company char-
ters that received more than 90% of the votes cast, but failed due to superma-
jority requirements). 
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supermajority of outstanding shares.34 Unvoted shares count as 
votes against the proposal.35 The problem of so-called “frozen 
charters” is particularly acute in that issuers frequently include 
provisions in their Initial Public Offering (IPO) charters that re-
strict the rights of public shareholders, such as classified boards 
or dual class voting structures.36 Low voter turnout may prevent 
issuers from removing these provisions when they are no longer 
valuable.37 
One possible way of increasing the level of retail investor 
voting is to permit retail investors the opportunity to submit 
standing voting instructions (SVI), also known as client-directed 
voting.38 Because most modern shareholders hold their stock in 
street name, their votes are cast by intermediaries on the basis 
of their voting instructions.39 Current SEC rules prohibit inter-
mediaries from soliciting SVI from their customers, however.40 
Because of these rules, although most institutional investors 
have access to an Internet-based voting platform that permits 
them to designate their voting instructions in advance, retail 
shareholders are unable to do so.  
 
 34. Charters of 88% of IPO companies in 2015 contained supermajority pro-
visions for approving mergers or amending the charter or bylaws. WILMER 
HALE, 2016 M&A REPORT 4 (2016), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/ 
Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2016-WilmerHale-MA 
-Report.pdf. 
 35. See Hirst, supra note 32, at 101 (“Most supermajority requirements are 
a percentage of shares outstanding, rather of the votes cast on the proposal.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Joseph A. Hall, The Impact of ISS’ New Policy on IPO Com-
pany Director Elections, HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/10/the-impact-of-iss 
-new-policy-on-ipo-company-director-elections (reporting results of survey find-
ing that “IPO companies continue to adopt charter provisions such as a classi-
fied board or dual class stock that can be viewed as having an anti-takeover 
impact, without any noticeable impact on valuation or marketing”). 
 37. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 38. The term client-directed voting was coined by Steve Norman in 2006. 
James McRitchie, An Open Proposal for Client Directed Voting, HARV. L. SCH.: 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 14, 2010), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2010/07/14/an-open-proposal-for-client-directed-voting. Commen-
tators have also used the term advance voting instructions or AVI. See, e.g., Luis 
A. Aguilar, Ensuring the Proxy Process Works for Shareholders, Statement by 
SEC Commissioner, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.sec 
.gov/news/statement/021915-psclaa.html. This paper will use the term SVI to 
refer to all such proposals. 
 39. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or 
Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683, 704 (1988) (describing this procedure). 
 40. See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
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As early as 2007, the SEC’s Proxy Working Group consid-
ered rule changes to facilitate SVI.41 To date, however, the SEC 
has failed to change its rules to allow retail investors to desig-
nate their voting instructions to a broker or voting platform in 
advance in the same manner as institutional investors. Rather, 
SVI has been characterized as highly controversial.42 Commen-
tators have raised concerns about its implementation43 and, 
more fundamentally, about its potential for contributing to un-
informed shareholder voting.44 
This Article considers these concerns. First, the Article ex-
plores and rejects the claim that the risk of uninformed voting 
justifies the SEC’s failure to remove the regulatory obstacles to 
SVI. Second, the Article reflects on the appropriate safeguards 
for the implementation of SVI that would minimize the potential 
for adverse effects on the voting process. Notably, reforming re-
tail investor voting by implementing SVI could make retail in-
vestor voting both more efficient and better informed. 
Rather than citing these concerns or the complexity of SVI 
as a basis for preventing its use by retail investors,45 the Com-
mission should adopt regulatory reforms not just to remove ex-
isting impediments but to integrate SVI into the process by 
which brokers solicit voting instructions. Such regulation would 
 
 41. See AUGUST 27, 2007 ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 
DATED JUNE 5, 2006, at 4–5, http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/ 
files/NYSE%20PWG%20Report%20Addendum%208-27-2007_0.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ADDENDUM] (describing the Working Group’s consideration of Steve Nor-
man’s proposal for client-directed voting). 
 42. See, e.g., KIMBERLY K. RUBEL & BREE F. ARCHAMBAULT, DRINKER BID-
DLE, SECURITIES UPDATE: PROXY PLUMBING CONCEPT RELEASE – A MOVE TO-
WARD PROXY PROCESS REFORM? 7, 11 (Sept. 2010), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
documents.lexology.com/01135a5e-45ca-4ea4-a0b0-39fe28fa47bf.pdf (describ-
ing SVI as “[t]he most controversial proposal to increase retail participation dis-
cussed in the [SEC’s 2010] Concept Release”). 
 43. See ALAN L. BELLER, JANET L. FISHER & REBECCA M. TABB, COUNCIL 
OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., CLIENT DIRECTED VOTING: SELECTED ISSUES AND DE-
SIGN PERSPECTIVES 12–15 (Aug. 2010), http://www.cii.org/files/publications/ 
white_papers/08_31_10_client_directed_voting_white_paper.pdf (describing po-
tential advantages and disadvantages of implementing SVI). 
 44. See RUBEL & ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 42, at 11 (explaining that SVI 
“creates a tension with the policy objective of obtaining informed investor 
votes”); Aguilar, supra note 38, at 5 (describing uninformed voting as “one of the 
fundamental concerns that have been previously raised about so-called ‘advance 
voting instructions’”).  
 45. Cf. BELLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 2 (“The complexity of CDV and the 
policy and regulatory issues it entails suggest to us that a robust CDV model is 
likely to have a long gestation period . . . .”). 
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reinforce the growing importance of shareholder voting. In addi-
tion, it would encourage greater retail investor engagement in 
corporate governance, which may serve as a useful counterpoint 
to the increasing empowerment of institutional investors.46 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article briefly 
surveys the background of shareholder voting and the develop-
ments that have led to the current devaluation of the retail in-
vestor. Part II describes the SVI model and evaluates the con-
cerns that have been raised about SVI. Part III critically 
examines the regulatory objective of informed shareholder vot-
ing and the role of that objective in the regulatory debate over 
SVI. Part IV identifies appropriate safeguards for the implemen-
tation of SVI. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING   
A. LEGAL AND MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER 
VOTING 
In 1932, Berle and Means published the classic The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, in which they identified the 
central challenge posed by the corporate form as the separation 
of ownership and control.47 The corporation to which Berle and 
Means referred was owned by dispersed public shareholders 
with small stakes.48 Indeed, Berle and Means argued that these 
small stakes prevented shareholders from holding management 
accountable.49 The dispersed model of corporate ownership per-
sisted—as recently as the early 1950s, institutional investors 
owned less than “10% of the stock of the 1000 largest, public com-
panies.”50 
 
 46. This Article takes as a given the existing role of shareholder voting in 
corporate governance and does not address the normative question of whether 
the existing level of shareholder power reflected in the voting process is optimal. 
For differing viewpoints on that issue, compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that 
shareholders should have greater power to make corporate decisions), with Wil-
liam W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empow-
erment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010) (arguing against increased shareholder 
power). 
 47. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 48. Id. at 47–65. 
 49. Id. 
 50. SUNEELA JAIN, BARBARA BLACKFORD, DONNA DABNEY & JAMES D. 
SMALL, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL BALANCE IN THE REL-
 20 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:11 
 
Today, the situation has changed. Institutional investors 
own a substantial majority of the shares of public companies.51 
At the largest issuers, institutional ownership exceeds 70%.52 As 
a result of their substantial voting power, institutional investors 
have become increasingly important. Issuers engage frequently 
with institutional investors,53 and this engagement has an effect 
on firm decisions.54 Some commentators have argued that, in 
fact, the re-concentration of ownership in the hands of institu-
tional investors has transformed corporate governance away 
from the Berle and Means focus on managerial agency costs, to 
a new system of agency capitalism in which the agency costs of 
institutional intermediaries have become more important than 
the managerial agency costs upon which Berle and Means fo-
cused their attention.55  
A variety of regulatory developments contributed to in-
creased institutional investor engagement in the voting process. 
In 1988, the DOL issued the so-called Avon Letter, the first of a 
series of statements advising the managers of pension funds that 
proxy voting was an important component of their fiduciary re-
sponsibilities under ERISA.56 The DOL followed up with several 
 
ATIVE ROLES OF MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS, AND INVESTORS IN THE GOVERN-
ANCE OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS? 9 (2014), http://www.shareholderforum.com/ 
access/Library/20140306_ConferenceBoard-Paper.pdf. 
 51. See, e.g., BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 8, at 
1 (“During the 2015 mini-season [July 1–Dec. 31], institutional investors owned 
62% of the street shares of U.S. companies, compared to 38% for retail inves-
tors.”). 
 52. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PROXY SEASON 
WRAP-UP 3 (3d ed. 2015), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge 
-2015-proxy-season-wrap-up.pdf (noting that institutional ownership varies by 
issuer size and that, as of 2015, institutions owned 72% of large issuers). 
 53. See MARC GOLDSTEIN, INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., DE-
FINING ENGAGEMENT: AN UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES 4 (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www 
.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/engagement-between 
-corporations-and-investors-at-all-time-high1.pdf (describing trends in level 
and type of engagement between issuers and investors). 
 54. Craig Doidge, Alexander Dyck, Hamed Mahmudi & Aazam Virani, Col-
lective Action and Governance Activism 34 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Pa-
per No. 2635662, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635662 (reporting findings 
that institutional investor ’s “activism through private engagements has an im-
pact, both in terms of value when its formation was announced, and in changing 
actual governance policies including majority voting, say-on-pay, compensation 
practices, and incentive pay”). 
 55. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 18. 
 56. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of La-
bor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 
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interpretive guidelines reinforcing this position.57 In 2003, the 
SEC adopted rules requiring mutual funds to develop policies 
and procedures with respect to voting shares in their portfolio 
companies and to disclose their votes on an annual basis.58 As a 
result of these regulations, a substantial percentage of institu-
tional investors began to take proxy voting more seriously.59 
Many institutional investors with substantial equity interests 
allocated specialized resources to analyzing governance issues 
and making voting decisions.60 Because institutional investors 
control a substantial number of votes, their policy concerns gen-
erate considerable public attention.61 
Market providers responded to increased institutional in-
vestor involvement in voting by providing them with new tools 
to facilitate the proxy voting process.62 ISS developed into the 
most important intermediary, on a global basis, providing insti-
tutional investors with a variety of services to assist them in ex-
ercising their voting power.63 ISS is perhaps best known for its 
 
1988), in 15 PENS. REP. (BNA) 371, 391 (Feb. 29, 1988) (“The decision[s] as to 
how proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”). 
 57. In 2008, the Department of Labor issued clear guidelines that stated, 
“the fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock 
includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of stock.” 
Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2017); Id. § 270.30bl-4. 
 59. See generally INDEP. DIR. COUNCIL & INV. CO. INST., OVERSIGHT OF 
FUND PROXY VOTING (July 2008), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_08_proxy_voting 
.pdf (explaining requirements for mutual fund directors to oversee proxy voting 
by their funds and practices used by directors to engage in that oversight). 
 60. See, e.g., Kirsten Grind & Joann S. Lublin, Vanguard and BlackRock 
Plan to Get More Assertive with Their Investments, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-and-blackrock-plan-to-get-more 
-assertive-with-their-investments-1425445200 (describing governance engage-
ment by BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, and noting that large mutual 
fund companies own sufficient stakes to be taken seriously by their portfolio 
companies). 
 61. Id. See also Joann S. Lublin, BlackRock Toughens Stance on Boards, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-to-take 
-tougher-stance-on-u-s-corporate-directors-1425414807 (reporting BlackRock’s 
announcement that “it may oppose board members’ re-election over such issues 
as excessive tenure, insufficient diversity, poor short-term attendance and cor-
porate bylaw changes that ignore investor rights”). BlackRock manages $4.65 
trillion in assets. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elec-
tions and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009) (describing 
developments at proxy advisory firms and the history and growth of ISS). 
 63. Id. at 649, 652. 
 22 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:11 
 
advisory services; it provides its investor-subscribers with infor-
mation about issues on which they are being asked to vote, as 
well as recommendations as to how to vote.64 ISS Voting Analyt-
ics collects and analyzes data about institutional voting policies, 
voting results, and patterns.65 In recent years, a second major 
proxy advisory firm, Glass Lewis, has gained prominence for the 
information and recommendations that it provides to subscrib-
ers.66 
Market intermediaries also offer institutional investors 
tools to simplify the mechanics of the voting process.67 ISS offers 
a service to its subscribers called ProxyExchange that permits 
them to outsource the mechanics of the voting process including 
executing ballots and maintaining voting records.68 Glass Lewis 
provides its clients with Viewpoint, a web-based voting plat-
form.69 Broadridge offers ProxyEdge, an Internet-based system 
that allows institutional investors to “[m]anage, track, reconcile 
and report [their] proxy voting through electronic delivery of bal-
lots,” and “[s]atisify SEC requirements regarding vote reporting 
and record keeping.”70 
 
 64. Id. at 652. 
 65. ISS VOTING ANALYTICS, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss 
-analytics/voting-analytics (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). 
 66. After ISS, Glass Lewis has the next largest client base. See Stephen J. 
Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Re-
ality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2010) (evaluating the influence of ISS and Glass 
Lewis); see also Ed Batts, Proxy Advisory Firms in Legislative Crosshairs, 
LAW360 (July 8, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/815410/proxy-advisory 
-firms-in-legislative-crosshairs (observing that the market for proxy advisory 
services is “dominated” by two firms: ISS and Glass Lewis). A number of addi-
tional firms provide advisory services that focus outside of the U.S. markets. 
See Elizabeth Judd, A Guide to Proxy Advisers, IR MAGAZINE (Sept. 3, 2014), 
https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-meetings/20359/ 
guide-proxy-advisers (identifying and describing a number of non-U.S. proxy 
advisory firms). 
 67. Proxy advisors have been subject to criticism both for the quality of the 
advisory services that they provide and for potential conflicts of interest. See, 
e.g., Choi et al., supra note 62, at 657–58 (describing accounts of advisor conflicts 
of interest). In response, SEC staff released guidance to institutional investors 
with respect to their reliance on proxy advisors. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 
No. 20 (IM/CF) (June 30, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm. 
 68. PROXYEXCHANGE, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/proxy 
-voting-services/proxy-exchange/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing Proxy 
Exchange). 
 69. Proxy Voting – Viewpoint, GLASS LEWIS, http://www.glasslewis.com/ 
proxy-voting (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing Viewpoint). 
 70. ProxyEdge, BROADRIDGE, https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/ 
broadridge-proxyedge-complete-proxy-management-from-voting-through 
-reporting.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing ProxyEdge). 
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Importantly, these institution-directed services allow their 
subscribers to provide standing voting instructions or SVI. 
Standing voting instructions are voting guidelines or policies 
provided by an investor to an intermediary in advance of a spe-
cific shareholder meeting, directing how the investor’s shares 
are to be voted. The intermediary then applies these instructions 
to each shareholder meeting, and casts the client’s vote in ac-
cordance with those instructions, unless the client directs other-
wise.71 SVI enable investors to coordinate votes for all the secu-
rities in their portfolios on a single platform, making them a 
critical component of an efficient voting process for institutional 
investors that may hold positions in thousands of portfolio com-
panies.72 As of 2014, for example, more than half of institutional 
users of ProxyEdge used some form of SVI.73 
Retail investors do not have access to an analogous mecha-
nism for voting their shares. The vast majority of retail investors 
hold their securities in street name, meaning that the investor, 
known as a beneficial owner, holds his or her securities through 
an intermediary—typically a bank or broker—known as a nomi-
nee or record holder.74 Street name ownership means that the 
beneficial owner is not listed on the issuer’s share registry as the 
holder of record. To protect the voting rights of beneficial owners, 
SEC rules require that the nominee holder forward proxy mate-
rials to the beneficial owner and obtain instructions from the 
beneficial owner as to how to vote the shares.75  
 
 71. See Letter from Glass Lewis to Mary Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-100 
.pdf (describing process of voting subscribers’ shares according to subscribers’ 
custom voting policies). 
 72. See, e.g., HEXAM Capital Partners, Proxy Voting Philosophy and Pro-
cedures, COPPIN COLLINGS app. 1 (Jan. 2016), http://coppincollings.com/pdf/ 
Proxy%20Voting%20-%20Version%207%20-%20January%202016.pdf (describ-
ing ProxyEdge and how its “quick vote tool allows you to vote the same way 
across all proposals with one click”). 
 73. Presentation, Broadridge, Status Update on Initiatives to Increase Re-
tail Voting Participation 12 (Aug. 8, 2014) (on file with author). 
 74. Many institutional investors hold their securities in street name as 
well. As of 2007, approximately eighty-five percent of exchange-traded securi-
ties were held through nominees. Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 23, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm. 
 75. See Keir D. Gumbs, Todd Hamblet & Kristin Stortini, Debunking the 
Myths Behind Voting Instruction Forms and Vote Reporting, 21 CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE ADVISOR 1, 1 (2013), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/ 
publications/2013/07/corp_gov_advisor_article-voting_instruction_forms_and_ 
vif_reporting.pdf (describing the SEC and NYSE rules protecting the voting 
rights of beneficial owners). The regulations require the soliciting party to bear 
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Retail investors must submit separate voting instructions 
for every shareholder meeting at each company in which they 
own stock. Platforms that consolidate the voting procedure, such 
as those offered to institutional investors, are neither open to nor 
cost-effective for retail investors. Although retail investors can 
use the Internet to submit their voting instructions, the mecha-
nism for doing so, proxyvote.com, has been described as “ineffi-
cient and clunky.”76 Until recently, retail investors were re-
quired to access proxyvote.com separately for each meeting by 
manually keying in a control number.77 Although Broadridge 
has improved proxyvote.com, incorporating some information 
from an investor’s past votes and, in some cases, allowing direct 
links from e-delivery, the functionality is far more limited than 
that available to institutional investors.78  
Perhaps the most important difference is the inability of re-
tail investors to submit SVI. Unlike institutions, retail investors 
cannot designate a set of voting preferences in advance, save 
their prior voting preferences, or designate a set of guidelines 
that will be applied automatically. As a result, investors must 
enter their voting instructions separately for each issuer, each 
issue and each annual meeting. In addition, proxyvote.com is 
purely a voting platform; it does not provide investors with in-
formation about the issues on which they are voting. Indeed, 
proxyvote.com is not fully integrated even with the federally 
mandated disclosure; access to that information via the 
proxyvote.com website requires a series of cumbersome click-
throughs to material stored on other websites.  
The SEC has not ignored developments in Internet technol-
ogy. Indeed, in 2007, the SEC embraced the Internet by revising 
 
the costs of transmitting proxy materials under Regulation 14A. The NYSE sets 
the maximum fee that brokers can charge an issuer for the transmission of 
proxy materials. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Order Granting Approval to 
Proposed Rule Change Amending NYSE Rules 451 and 465 and the Related 
Provisions of Section 402.10 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (Oct. 18, 
2013) [hereinafter Rulemaking Order], https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/ 
2013/34-70720.pdf (adopting changes to NYSE proxy fee structure). 
 76. Letter from Moxy Vote to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 6 (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2012/petn4-651 
.pdf. 
 77. Id. 
 78. The differences stem from a variety of reasons including cost, regula-
tory barriers, and the fact that retail investors do not subscribe to the advisory 
services whose recommendations are integrated into the institutional voting 
sites. See also infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (describing the regula-
tory barriers). 
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the proxy solicitation rules to eliminate the requirement that is-
suers provide investors with a full copy of the mandated disclo-
sures.79 This rule change, known as e-proxy, substituted notice 
and access for full distribution, enabling issuers to satisfy the 
disclosure requirements by posting proxy materials on their 
website and providing investors with a notice of the posting.80 E-
proxy enhances efficiency, in that it allows issuers to avoid the 
high cost of printing and mailing proxy materials to all their 
shareholders.81 At the same time, however, electronic delivery 
may reduce the visibility of voting issues.82 Some statistics sug-
gest that e-proxy has contributed to lower retail voter turnout.83 
The reasons for this effect are unclear,84 but replacing the writ-
ten proxy statement with just a notice may reduce the salience 
 
 79. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29, 
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249, and 274); Shareholder Choice 
Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,222 (Aug. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of 
Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9108 (Feb. 22, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9108.pdf. 
 80. Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,222 
(Aug. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Investors are entitled to re-
ceive a paper copy of the full proxy material, at no cost, on request. Id. at 42,224. 
 81. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing 
Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 475 (2008) (arguing that e-proxy offers a cheaper and more efficient al-
ternative to the traditional proxy contest). 
 82. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Official Calls for Review of Electronic Proxy 
Delivery Rules, REUTERS, (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec 
-proxy-idUSKBN0LN24D20150219 (stating that such rules likely have de-
pressed retail investor participation in elections). 
 83. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 23 (arguing that e-proxy may have contrib-
uted to the turnout of only 4% percent of Apple’s retail shareholders at the 2008 
annual meeting); FABIO SACCONE, CONFERENCE BOARD, E-PROXY REFORM, AC-
TIVISM, AND THE DECLINE IN RETAIL SHAREHOLDER VOTING 4 (Dec. 2010), 
http://shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101200_ConferenceBoard 
.pdf (citing a speech by SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins) (reporting retail vote 
of 16.4% for issuers that did not deliver paper proxy materials); Aguilar, supra 
note 38 (“[R]etail response rates have declined each year since the introduction 
of the notice and access model.”); Lynch, supra note 82 (quoting statement by 
Robert Schifellite, an executive with Broadridge Financial Solutions, that “re-
tail investors vote 41 percent of the shares when they receive the full mailed 
packet, versus 23 percent when notified by e-mail, and a mere 18 percent when 
notified about voting by mail”). 
 84. See, e.g., Amendments to the Rules Requiring Internet Availability of 
Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9073, at 7 (Oct. 14, 2009), https:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9073.pdf (describing lower voting turnout 
after adoption of e-proxy but noting that “[t]he available data do not necessarily 
exclude the possibility that factors other than requirements of our notice and 
access rules may contribute to the different voting response rates, although the 
available data do not identify them”). 
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of the issues on which shareholders are going to be asked to 
vote.85 In addition, shareholders who receive only a notice of the 
annual meeting may be unwilling to make the additional effort 
to obtain a full set of the proxy materials.86 
No regulation requires retail investors to vote their stock,87 
and the multi-step aspect of e-proxy coupled with the rational 
apathy of small investors, traditionally, led relatively few retail 
investors to submit voting instructions.88 For many years, the 
effect of low retail voter turnout was masked, however, by dis-
cretionary broker voting.89 NYSE rules in effect since 1937, and 
NYSE Rule 452 in particular, granted brokers discretionary vot-
ing authority with respect to routine matters.90 Rule 452, known 
as the ten-day rule, provided that if the beneficial owner did not 
provide voting instructions at least ten days before the share-
holders meeting, the broker was free to vote those uninstructed 
shares as he or she saw fit.91  
 
 85. Alternatively, the delivery of the notice may have created confusion 
among investors as to how to cast their vote. See id. at 8 (describing this possi-
bility). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 6–7 (observing substantially lower voting rate by share-
holders that received notice only, as opposed to those that received delivery of a 
full set of proxy materials). 
 87. Noam Noked, The Promise of the Enhanced Broker Internet Platform, 
HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. & FIN. REG. (Sept. 22, 2013), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/22/the-promise-of-the-enhanced-broker 
-internet-platform. 
 88. See JEFFREY T. HARTLIN & PAUL HASTINGS: STAY CURRENT, THE SEC 
APPROVES THE ELIMINATION OF BROKER DISCRETIONARY VOTING IN ALL DIREC-
TOR ELECTIONS 3 (Aug. 2009), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default 
-source/PDFs/1385.pdf (reporting that, in 2009, voting instructions were sub-
mitted for only 32% of retail shares). “Data from the 2005 proxy season indicates 
that the voting rights relating to 56% of accounts with shares held in street 
name were not exercised by their beneficial owners. Presumably, many of these 
shares were nonetheless voted by brokers.” William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case 
Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and Shareholders’ Meetings, 74 
TENN. L. REV. 199, 220 (2007). 
 89. Sjostrom, supra note 88, at 220 (“Broker votes of uninstructed shares 
typically represent five to ten percent of votes cast at an annual shareholders’ 
meeting.”). 
 90. See SEC Publishes for Comment Proposed Amendment to NYSE Rule to 
Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting in Uncontested Director Elections, GIB-
SON DUNN: CLIENT ALERT (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
publications/pages/SECProposedAmendmentToNYSERuletoEliminate 
BrokerDiscretionaryVoting.aspx (recounting history of Rule 452). 
 91. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, at 4 n.12 (July 1, 2009) 
[hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215], https://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf. With respect to routine matters, including uncon-
tested elections, if a beneficial owner does not provide instructions at least ten 
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In 2004, the Business Roundtable submitted a petition re-
questing the SEC to revise its proxy rules.92 The Business 
Roundtable observed that various aspects of the proxy rules had 
become outdated and that technological innovations warranted 
the implementation of a better system of communicating with 
shareholders.93 Among the proposals was a request that the SEC 
eliminate the circuitous process that required beneficial owners 
to use their broker as an intermediary in the voting process.94 
The Business Roundtable suggested replacing the existing vot-
ing process with one that would enable beneficial owners to vote 
their shares directly.95 The petition also noted that various de-
velopments were leading to the erosion of the ten-day rule and 
that a number of commentators had proposed that the rule be 
eliminated as obsolete.96 The Business Roundtable argued that 
this provided additional reason to facilitate direct investor vot-
ing.97 
The Business Roundtable’s predictions regarding the ten-
day rule were accurate. Over the course of the next several years, 
the NYSE gradually began to cut back on the scope of the ten-
day rule. The regulatory changes limited the scope of discretion-
ary voting authority by classifying an increasing number of vot-
ing issues as non-routine.98 As the Business Roundtable’s peti-
tion had noted, in 2003, the NYSE had already classified 
 
days before the meeting, the broker is free to, and typically does, vote these 
uninstructed shares as it chooses. Sjostrom, supra note 88, at 220. 
 92. See Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Shareholder Communications, 
Business Roundtable [hereinafter Rulemaking Petition], http://www 
.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/BRT%20Petition%204-16-08_0.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2017). 
 93. Id. at 1. 
 94. Id. at 11. 
 95. Id. at 2. John Wilcox submitted a comment letter earlier, in 2003, mak-
ing a similar recommendation. See Letter from John C. Wilcox, Vice Chairman, 
Georgeson S’holder Commc’ns, Inc., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC File No. 
S7-19-03 (Dec. 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/georgeson 
121203.htm. 
 96. Rulemaking Petition, supra note 92, at 8. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In 2005, the NYSE created its Proxy Working Group for the purpose of 
reviewing the NYSE’s rules concerning proxy voting with a particular focus on 
Rule 452. See Proxy Working Group, NYSE, Inc., Report and Recommendations 
of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange, at 1 (June 5, 
2006), http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/NYSE%20 
Proxy%20Working%20Grp%20Rpt%206-5-2006.pdf. At that time, NYSE Rule 
452 classified eighteen items as non-routine, but including uncontested director 
elections, among other items, as routine. Id. The Working Group recommended 
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shareholder approval of equity compensation plans as a non-rou-
tine matter for which discretionary broker voting was not per-
mitted.99 
Similarly, in 2009, the SEC approved the NYSE’s request to 
amend Rule 452 to eliminate discretionary voting in uncontested 
director elections.100 Subsequently, the NYSE extended the ban 
to the shareholder vote mandated by Dodd-Frank in connection 
with executive compensation. On January 25, 2012, the NYSE 
amended the rules to prohibit discretionary voting on corporate 
governance issues such as charter and bylaw amendments.101  
Today, brokers are prohibited from exercising discretionary 
voting authority with respect to most issues on which sharehold-
ers are asked to vote.102 Instead, nominee holders such as banks 
and brokers are supposed to obtain voting instructions from the 
beneficial owners of the securities and to vote the shares in ac-
cordance with those instructions.103 Rule 14b-1(d) requires bro-
kers to solicit voting instructions, but it does not specify the form 
that the broker’s request must take.104 Unlike Rule 14a-4 which 
contains explicit specifications for the required form of proxy,105 
there is no similar requirement for the voter information form 
(VIF), or a mandate that it contain identical language to that on 
the formal proxy.106 Instead, the regulations leave the procedure 
 
that the rule be changed to classify uncontested director elections as non-rou-
tine. Id. at 4. The NYSE subsequently sought SEC approval to amend Rule 452. 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91, at 1. 
 99. Exchange Act Release No. 34-48108, supra note 14. 
 100. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91. Notably, the 
rule change retained the broker-vote at open-end investment companies (mu-
tual funds) because mutual funds are largely retail held, and since retail inves-
tors are less likely to vote, it is costly for funds to solicit votes. Id. at 15–17. 
 101. NYSE, Inc., Information Memo No. 12-4, “Application of Rule 452 to 
Certain Types of Corporate Governance Proxy Proposals” (Jan. 25, 2012). 
 102. Leigh P. Ryan, Michael L. Zuppone & Rebecca A. Brophy, NYSE Imple-
ments New Restrictions on Broker Discretionary Voting, PAUL HASTINGS: CLI-
ENT ALERT, at 1 (Mar. 2012). The primary issue that remains classified as rou-
tine is the ratification of the firm’s auditors. See id. at 2 (“The NYSE has 
specifically noted that the ratification of independent auditors continues to be a 
routine or ‘Broker May Vote’ matter . . . .”). 
 103. Rule 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2017) regulates the process of dis-
closing proxy materials to beneficial owners and soliciting voting instructions. 
See Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
62495, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,984–85 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Proxy 
Plumbing Release] (describing this process). 
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1. 
 105. Gumbs et al., supra note 75, at 4. 
 106. See James McRitchie, SEC’s IAC Seeks Input for Agenda, SHARE-
HOLDER ACTIVIST, http://www.theshareholderactivist.com/shareholder-policies 
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for obtaining voting instructions to the discretion of the record 
holder.107  
Although the existing rules require brokers to establish a 
website at which investors can access the request for voting in-
structions, the existing rules do not require the website even to 
provide investors with access to the proxy statement and other 
soliciting materials.108 In addition, the rule only obligates a bro-
ker to solicit voting instructions once it has received proxy ma-
terials from a soliciting party.109 
In practice, most nominee holders outsource the transmis-
sion of proxy materials and the solicitation of voting instructions 
to a private service provider—Broadridge.110 Broadridge pro-
vides investor communications technology supporting the proxy 
voting process for more than 90% of public companies in North 
America.111 Issuers, rather than nominees or record holders, 
bear the cost of compliance with Regulation 14A and are re-
quired to reimburse brokers for the costs of compliance under a 
fee schedule set by the NYSE.112 
 
-investor-regulations/secs-iac-seeks-input-for-agenda (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) 
(describing differences in the language of a shareholder proposal and the lan-
guage that appeared on Broadridge’s VIF). 
 107. Gumbs et al., supra note 75, at 6 n.22. See also Amendments to Rules 
Requiring Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, supra note 79, at 11 (observ-
ing that the notice required under e-proxy does not have to conform to Rule 14a-
4 or “directly mirror the proxy card”). 
 108. See Rule 14b-1(d)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2017) (noting that the pro-
vision of such access is “at the broker or dealer ’s option”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, supra note 74 (“Most bro-
ker-dealers outsource proxy processing functions, including forwarding proxy 
materials to beneficial owners and collecting voting information from beneficial 
owners for forwarding to the issuer.”); Recommendations of the Investor Advi-
sory Committee: Impartiality in the Disclosure of Preliminary Voting Results, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, at 2 (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
investor-advisory-committee-2012/impartiality-disclosure-prelim-voting-re-
sults.pdf (“[B]rokers almost universally contract out the tasks to a single inter-
mediary, Broadridge.”). 
 111. FORTUNE Magazine Names Broadridge One of the “World’s Most Ad-
mired Companies,” BROADRIDGE, (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.broadridge.com/ 
press-release/2016/broadridge-named-one-of-the-worlds-most-admired 
-companies. 
 112. Broadridge bills issuers directly for this service pursuant to a fee sched-
ule established by the NYSE and Nasdaq. Proxy Plumbing Release, supra note 
103, at 56. 
 30 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:11 
 
B. INITIATIVES TO FACILITATE RETAIL INVESTOR VOTING 
From the time that the NYSE Proxy Working Group first 
began to consider limiting the scope of discretionary broker vot-
ing, commentators recognized that the contemplated regulatory 
changes would dramatically reduce the percentage of retail 
shares voted because very few retail shareholders submit voting 
instructions.113 At that time, the Working Group made several 
recommendations aimed at increasing retail voting, including in-
creasing efforts to educate investors about the proxy voting sys-
tem and supporting issuer efforts to communicate with benefi-
cial owners.114 In its subsequent addendum, which focused on 
the difficulty for issuers of obtaining a quorum in the absence of 
broker voting, the Working Group identified proportional voting 
and client-directed voting as possible solutions.115 
SVI was suggested by Steve Norman, who was a member of 
the Working Group and the Corporate Secretary of American Ex-
press.116 Norman suggested that investors be permitted to sub-
mit a good-until-cancelled instruction as part of their brokerage 
agreement which would allow the designation of one of four vot-
ing positions for all securities held in the investor’s account: (1) 
follow the board’s recommendation; (2) vote against the board’s 
recommendation; (3) abstain; (4) vote proportionally with the re-
tail votes for which the broker has received voting instruc-
tions.117 Norman contemplated that the instructions would op-
erate as a default in the event that the investor did not submit 
specific voting instructions for a particular shareholder meet-
ing.118 The proposal contemplated that these instructions could 
always be revoked by the investor, either generally or with re-
spect to a specific meeting.119 
The Working Group debated the merits of Norman’s pro-
posal but did not reach a conclusion.120 Although members of the 
group recognized various advantages to the proposal, they also 
identified a number of concerns.121 Arguably the most serious 
 
 113. Id. at 88–89. 
 114. Id. at 4–5. 
 115. ADDENDUM, supra note 41, at 3–5. Proportional voting would have 
given brokers the discretion to vote shares for which they did not receive voting 
instructions in the same proportion as instructed shares. Id. at 3. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. Id. at 5. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 4–6. 
 121. Id. at 5. 
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was the risk of uninformed voting.122 As the addendum ex-
plained, “it was noted that the [client-directed voting (CDV)] pro-
posal could make it easy for investors (particularly retail inves-
tors) to disengage from the proxy process, and essentially make 
important voting decisions in advance without full information 
about the matters to be voted upon.”123 
In 2007, the SEC held a roundtable on broker voting.124 In 
its public statement concerning the roundtable, the SEC noted 
the Proxy Working Group’s identification of CDV as a possible 
alternative to discretionary broker voting.125 The SEC noted, 
however, that “[c]lient-directed voting may raise concerns be-
cause the client (beneficial owner) is being asked to make a vot-
ing decision prior to receiving any proxy materials.”126 
Commentators on the SEC’s 2009 rulemaking also sug-
gested that the SEC make the necessary rule changes to permit 
either CDV or SVI.127 The SEC declined to do so, observing in its 
subsequent release approving the NYSE rule change that “[w]ith 
respect to client directed voting, the Commission notes that it 
raises a variety of questions and concerns, such as requiring 
shareholders to make a voting determination in advance of re-
ceiving a proxy statement with the disclosures mandated under 
the federal securities laws and without consideration of the is-
sues to be voted upon.”128 
The SEC continued to consider whether to adopt changes to 
the proxy rules to permit SVI. In July 2010, the SEC issued the 
“Proxy Plumbing Release.”129 The Proxy Plumbing Release 
sought input on a broad variety of issues related to proxy voting 
in an effort to identify mechanisms for improving the current 
system.130  
Among the topics addressed by the release was SVI.131 The 
SEC acknowledged that the low level of voting by retail investors 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, supra note 74. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91, at 34 (noting 
SEC approval of amendments to NYSE Rule 452). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Proxy Plumbing Release, supra note 103. 
 130. See id. at 10 (“[W]e remain interested in ways to improve our proxy 
disclosure, solicitation, and distribution rules.”). 
 131. Id. at 81–86. The SEC noted the existing proxy rules would not permit 
brokers to solicit SVI from their customers. See id. at 84 (“There is currently no 
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was “a source of concern,”132 and that commentators had pro-
posed SVI as a tool to increase retail investor participation in 
voting.133 The SEC observed, however, that SVI raised “a variety 
of questions and concerns.”134 It noted that an SVI system would 
require “investors to make a voting decision in advance of receiv-
ing a proxy statement containing the disclosures mandated un-
der the federal securities laws and possibly without considera-
tion of the specific issues to be voted upon.”135 It also warned that 
the availability of SVI might serve as a disincentive for investors 
to read the proxy statement.136  
Part of the Proxy Plumbing Release solicited comments on 
whether the SEC should adopt regulatory changes to permit re-
tail investors to submit SVI.137 The SEC also solicited comments 
on a related proposal—the development of an enhanced broker 
internet platform (EBIP), which would enable investors to re-
ceive proxy information and submit voting instructions through 
their brokerage account website.138 As with SVI, an EBIP would 
provide retail investors with functionality currently only availa-
ble to institutional investors. It would also create a mechanism 
for investors to submit or modify their SVI through their broker-
age accounts. 
The Proxy Plumbing Release did not lead the SEC to adopt 
reforms to the proxy voting process. The SEC revisited the pos-
sible need for reforms in its 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable.139 
Again, the subject of SVI was raised.140 Several roundtable par-
ticipants noted that commentators had proposed various forms 
of SVI for a number of years.141 At the Roundtable, Alan Beller 
 
applicable exemption for securities intermediaries to solicit advance voting in-
structions from their customers.”). 
 132. Id. at 78. 
 133. Id. at 81–84. 
 134. Id. at 83. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id.  
 137. Id. at 1–2. The SEC specifically observed that such reforms would ena-
ble retail investors access to a service that is presently available to institutional 
investors. Id. at 84. 
 138. Id. at 80–81. 
 139. Proxy Voting Roundtable, U.S. SEC. EXCH. & COMM’N, https://www.sec 
.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). For an 
unofficial transcript of the roundtable, see 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra 
note 26. 
 140. 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 26, at 133, 138–41. 
 141. Id. 
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observed that the potential disadvantages of SVI could be crys-
talized into a single essential concern—that permitting SVI 
would increase the potential for uninformed voting.142 By defini-
tion, investors who submit SVI would be making their voting de-
cisions in advance of, and without access to, the federally-man-
dated disclosures contained in the proxy statement. Arguably, 
then, SVI can be viewed as in tension with the disclosure-based 
approach to investor protection that animates federal securities 
regulation. Put more strongly, federally-mandated disclosure 
would potentially be irrelevant to shareholders who do not use 
that information to decide how to vote. 
Despite the absence of regulatory changes, private market 
providers have attempted to respond to the concerns identified 
in the Proxy Plumbing Release and the 2015 Roundtable by de-
veloping mechanisms to facilitate retail investor voting. These 
experiments have had limited success, due in part to regulatory 
impediments.143 Perhaps the best known effort was Moxy Vote, 
an internet-based platform created by a private investment firm 
that was designed to allow retail investors both to cast their 
votes, and to view information from institutional investors such 
as hedge funds.144 The site simplified the mechanics of the voting 
process by allowing shareholders to mirror other shareholders’ 
votes or to cast their votes in accordance with particular advo-
cacy positions or predetermined voting policies.145 For share-
holders to use Moxy Vote, however, their brokers had to forward 
voting authority to Moxy Vote, and some brokers were unwilling 
to do so.146 
 
 142. For comments of Alan Beller, see id. at 129. 
 143. See Robin Miller, Shareholder Advocacy in Corporate Elections: Case 
Studies in Proxy Voting Websites for Retail Investors, CLARK U. INT’L DEV., COM-
MUNITY & ENV’T, Paper 52, at 5 (May 1, 2016) (“[O]f the several websites that 
were created in the United States [to facilitate retail investor voting] including 
Moxy Vote, Sharegate.com, Shareowners.org, United States Proxy Exchange 
and ProxyDemocracy.org, all but one site have effectively ceased operations.”). 
 144. Joseph N. DiStefano, West Chester ’s Moxy Vote Boosts Rebel Sharehold-
ers, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 20, 2009), http://philly.com/philly/blogs/inq 
-phillydeals/West_Chesters_MoxyVote_boosts_rebel_shareholder_voices_.html 
(Moxy Vote was started as a for-profit market intermediary with seed funding 
from an investment partnership, and at the time of its creation, it was unclear 
whether the site could be funded through advertising subscriptions or fees). 
 145. See generally Letter from Larry Eiben to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2012/ 
petn4-651.pdf (describing Moxy Vote).  
 146. McRitchie, supra note 7 (“Some brokers were refusing to deliver to the 
now defunct Moxy Vote CDV system.”). 
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Moxy Vote ceased operations in 2012, due to a combination 
of regulatory hurdles and the reluctance of custodial brokers to 
allow their customers to vote through the site.147 At that time, 
Moxy Vote petitioned the SEC for a rulemaking to permit a “neu-
tral Internet voting platform” that would enable retail investors 
to designate a neutral internet site for delivery of proxy infor-
mation, storing voting preferences, and executing shareholder 
votes.148 To date, the SEC has not enacted such a rule.149 
Although Moxy Vote’s effort to combine internet proxy vot-
ing with information relevant to the voting decision was not suc-
cessful, other market participants have continued to innovate. 
Broadridge, for example, has continued to develop and expand 
technological tools for retail investor voting. Broadridge’s inno-
vations offered retail investors the first modern alternatives to 
submitting their voting instructions by mail—initially enabling 
telephonic submission and then electronic submissions through 
proxyvote.com. Of the retail shares that are currently voted, 
more than two-thirds are voted through proxyvote.com.150  
Broadridge has innovated with respect to proxyvote.com as 
well. For example, Broadridge developed a one-click button to 
allow investors to vote in accordance with the board’s recommen-
dations on all issues, rather than providing instructions sepa-
rately for each issue on the proxy card.151 Critics objected to the 
button, however, because Broadridge did not offer a similar 
 
 147. Richard Finger, Shareholders, Shake Off Your Apathy and Vote to Stop 
Tom Ward and Michael Dell, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/richardfinger/2013/02/21/shareholders-shake-off-your-apathy-and-vote-to 
-stop-tom-ward-and-michael-dell-from-screwing-you; see also Jeff Blumenthal, 
Done In By Regulatory Stumbling Blocks, Moxy Vote Says, PHILA. BUS. J. (July 
20, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/print-edition/2012/07/20/ 
done-in-by-regulatory-stumbling.html (“Individual shareholders have no legal 
grounds to compel their brokers to deliver ballots electronically to Internet vot-
ing platforms. Many brokerages told Moxy Vote that they would send them only 
when required to do so by regulators.”). 
 148. See Eiben, supra note 145.  
 149. See James McRitchie, The False Promise of the Enhanced Broker Inter-
net Platform, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.corpgov.net/ 
2013/09/the-false-promise-of-the-enhanced-broker-internet-platform (advocat-
ing for a similar but broader proposal for an “open CDV” that would allow any-
one to create a voting feed and enable retail shareholders to choose a feed as the 
basis for their proxy votes). 
 150. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 8, at 2. 
 151. Ross Kerber, Proxy Sites Dump One-Click Vote Button on SEC Con-
cerns, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/proxy-voting 
-website-idUSL1N0C5D3M20130320. 
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mechanism for investors to vote against all the board recommen-
dations, creating an uneven playing field.152 Broadridge subse-
quently removed the button.153 Broadridge has also added fea-
tures to the site, such as enabling an investor to cast votes for 
pending shareholders meetings at more than one issuer after en-
tering a single control number, so long as the shares are held in 
the same account.  
Although Broadridge has continued to develop 
proxyvote.com to simplify the mechanics of the voting process,154 
the challenge is that brokers are not currently required to con-
nect the platform to retail investors’ brokerage accounts. As a 
result, many investors must use proxyvote.com to submit voting 
instructions to their brokers.155 Retail investors could engage in 
internet voting more efficiently if they had access to a single plat-
form to manage their account—a platform that would include se-
curities positions, notice of upcoming shareholder meetings, ac-
cess to proxy information, and the ability to cast the investor’s 
vote. In addition, proxyvote.com does not offer investors the abil-
ity to submit SVI and does not include additional information 
that might assist shareholders in making their decisions, such 
as the recommendations of proxy advisors or information on how 
other large investors are voting. 
Importantly, brokers—who indirectly control retail voting 
through the voting mechanisms that they provide to their cus-
tomers—have limited incentives to provide their customers with 
more efficient voting procedures. Brokers do not bear the cost of 
soliciting voting instructions; Regulation 14A requires issuers to 
compensate nominee holders for the costs of forwarding proxy 
material and collecting voting instructions. The NYSE oversees 
this system by setting the rules concerning the fees that issuers 
 
 152. See, e.g., James McRitchie, ProxyVote.com Encourages Zombie Voting, 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (MAY 31, 2012), https://www.corpgov.net/2012/05/ 
proxyvote-com-encourages-zombie-voting (“The vote with management button 
results in zombie voting.”). 
 153. See Gumbs et al., supra note 75, at 4 (arguing that the button might 
have seemed to be in tension with Rule 14a-4, which requires that shareholders 
be given the opportunity to vote individually on each matter under considera-
tion, although shareholders would obviously not have been required to use the 
button if they wanted to vote separately on each matter). 
 154. See, e.g., Broadridge Introduces the First Mobile ProxyVote Platform 
Shareholders Can Now Vote on Smartphones and Other Mobile Devices, 
BROADRIDGE (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.broadridge.com/news-events/press 
-releases/Broadridge-Introduces-the-First-Mobile-ProxyVote-Platform.html 
(describing Broadridge’s expansion of proxyvote.com to mobile devices). 
 155. Proxy Plumbing Release, supra note 103, at 80. 
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must pay to broker-dealers for this process.156 The system does 
not, however, create any financial incentive for brokers to seek 
out retail votes or to make the voting process easier for their cus-
tomers. As a result, in 2010, the NYSE created the Proxy Fee 
Advisory Committee (PFAC) to review the existing fee structure 
and make recommendations.157 Among the PFAC’s objectives 
was to “encourage and facilitate active voting participation by 
retail street-name shareholders.”158 
In its comments on the SEC’s Proxy Plumbing release, 
Broadridge suggested to the PFAC that it could further this ob-
jective through the use of EBIPs, also known as investor mail-
boxes.159 Like Moxy Vote, EBIPs centralize the mechanics of 
proxy voting for retail shareholders by allowing them to vote 
their proxies on their broker’s website, as well as providing them 
with consolidated access to proxy materials and other infor-
mation. Although Broadridge was not successful in persuading 
the SEC to adopt EBIPs through rulemaking,160 it argued to the 
PFAC that brokers could be encouraged to cooperate with 
Broadridge to implement EBIPs if they were compensated 
through an incentive fee.161 
The NYSE agreed and, in 2013, amended its rules to estab-
lish an incentive fee program designed to encourage brokers to 
develop and encourage the use of EBIPs.162 Since 2013, 
Broadridge has developed an investor mailbox that can be di-
rectly integrated into the broker’s website, allowing the broker’s 
customers to submit voting instructions directly through that 
 
 156. See RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY FEE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO 
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 2–3 (May 16, 2012), http://www 
.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/NYSE%20PFAC%20Report%20 
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mittee] (explaining that “in 2012, issuers paid approximately $200 million in 
aggregate on fees for proxy distribution to street name shareholders during a 
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 157. See id. at 1, 6–7 (describing the formation and composition of the 
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 159. Rulemaking Order, supra note 75, at 24.  
 160. Noked, supra note 87. 
 161. See Recommendations of the Proxy Fee Advisory Committee, supra note 
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 162. Rulemaking Order, supra note 75, at 55. The rules permit brokers to 
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through which they provide investors with notice of upcoming meetings and a 
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website.163 The incentive fee has increased broker use of EBIPs, 
but progress has been limited, in large part because broker par-
ticipation remains voluntary. The limited progress has led some 
commentators to criticize the SEC for failing to mandate broker 
cooperation in the development of EBIPs.164 As of September 
2016, brokers that provide their customers with access to EBIPs 
handle 58% of all street positions.165 In addition, the functional-
ity of EBIPs is limited by existing proxy solicitation rules, as will 
be discussed in the next Part.  
Another market participant is ProxyDemocracy.org. 
ProxyDemocracy provides retail investors with information, in a 
searchable format, about pending voting issues, as well as how 
major mutual funds and other institutional investors are voting 
on those issues.166 Although this information is useful, it is not 
linked to a voting platform for retail shareholders. Accordingly, 
investors using proxyvote.com must shift to ProxyDemocracy for 
each shareholder meeting at which they want to vote.167 In ad-
dition, ProxyDemocracy does not provide investors with a mech-
anism by which they can automatically cast their votes in the 
same way that a designated institutional shareholder is voting, 
and the website is limited to information from ten institutional 
investors.168 
Private market voting platforms are not the only possible 
tool for increasing retail investor voting. An alternative ap-
proach would rely on individual issuers to provide investors with 
rewards or incentives for voting their shares. In 2010, Prudential 
demonstrated the potential value of this approach when it cre-
ated an innovative vote incentive program. The program offered 
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18, 2017). 
 167. See Advance Disclosers, PROXYDEMOCRACY, http://proxydemocracy.org/ 
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investors who voted their shares the choice of having a tree 
planted or receiving an eco-friendly tote bag.169 Prudential’s pro-
gram appears to have been successful in increasing voting by 
shareholders who had not previously voted, and other companies 
might be able to increase retail voting by adopting similar pro-
grams.170 Prudential is somewhat unique, however, in that it did 
not have to rely as heavily as most companies on the cooperation 
of broker intermediaries because it has a substantial number of 
retail shareholders who are holders of record.171 Most companies 
in which retail shareholders hold through intermediaries would 
find implementing a voting incentive program to be more 
costly.172  
In a recent paper Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili propose a 
somewhat different approach to increasing retail voting—a 
nudge.173 Structured after Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s 
well known book,174 the proposal would offer investors “highly 
visible voting default arrangements that would . . . allow (or 
force) them to choose from a menu of voting short-cuts.”175 The 
idea behind the nudge is to enable investors to use short-cuts to 
streamline the voting process by allowing shareholders to set up 
and opt-in to default voting arrangements or preferences, rather 
than being forced to specify votes on each individual issue at 
each issuer. The proposal strongly resembles the types of voting 
arrangements that are currently available to institutional inves-
tors. 
The nascent market developments suggest that harnessing 
technology to make retail voting more efficient offers the great-
est promise for increasing retail participation. The model for do-
ing so can be found in the voting platform that market forces 
 
 169. See Our Approach to Shareholder Engagement, PRUDENTIAL, http:// 
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currently provide to institutional investors. Although the pro-
gress with EBIPs has substantially improved the efficiency of 
the retail process, the functionality of EBIPs is limited so long 
as they cannot be used to submit SVI. Further, retail investors 
have demonstrated their interest in having the ability to submit 
SVI. Broadridge conducted two separate online surveys of inves-
tor interest in SVI in 2011 and 2014.176 In their survey re-
sponses, investors overwhelming reported that they viewed SVI 
as making it easier to vote their shares and that they would be 
more likely to vote if this service were available to them.177 
II.  SVI AND EXISTING REGULATORY CONSTRAINT   
As the preceding Part explains, institutional investors have 
access to a variety of services that simplify the mechanics of 
proxy voting, including: (1) a centralized Internet platform on 
which they can access information relating to voting matters for 
their entire portfolio; (2) the ability to cast votes through this 
platform; and (3) the ability to designate voting policies or pref-
erences, rather than casting votes on an individual, firm-by-firm 
basis. The institutional experience demonstrates that the tech-
nological challenges to providing these services are minimal. 
Nonetheless, EBIPs—the closest retail analogue—provide only a 
subset of these services, and are available only to a fraction of 
the retail investor population. Specifically, EBIPs do not offer 
retail investors the opportunity to designate their voting prefer-
ences in advance or to submit voting guidelines that would apply 
across their entire portfolio. SVI provides this functionality. 
Market participants are precluded from offering SVI to retail in-
vestors because of existing provisions in the SEC’s rules regulat-
ing the solicitation of proxies. This Part identifies the existing 
regulatory barriers to SVI and explains how they could be elim-
inated. 
Under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
the SEC has the authority to regulate the proxy solicitation pro-
cess.178 The SEC has set out the scope of its regulatory authority 
by defining as proxy solicitations all communications to share-
 
 176. See Presentation, Broadridge, Evaluation of Proxyvote.com 29–33 (Jan. 
2015) (on file with author). 
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 178. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012). 
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holders that are “reasonably calculated to result in the procure-
ment, withholding or revocation of a proxy.”179 The SEC rules 
provide that, unless an exemption applies, all proxy soliciting 
material must be filed with the SEC.180 In addition, most proxy 
solicitations require that the speaker file a proxy statement and 
provide that statement to shareholders.181  
Brokers, as discussed above,182 are the gatekeepers for retail 
voting, both because the provisions of Regulation 14A require 
brokers to solicit voting instructions183 and NYSE rules compen-
sate them for doing so.184 A broker’s request for voting instruc-
tions from its customer is a communication reasonably calcu-
lated to result in the procurement of a proxy. The request 
therefore falls within the SEC’s definition of a proxy solicita-
tion.185 
To enable brokers to solicit voting instructions without fear 
of liability, the SEC has created a regulatory exemption for cer-
tain communications from a broker to its customers. Under Rule 
14a-2(a)(1), brokers can transmit third-party proxy solicitation 
material to their customers and request voting instructions so 
long as the broker: (1) receives no compensation other than re-
imbursement of its costs; (2) promptly furnishes all proxy solic-
iting material; and (3) impartially requests a proxy or voting in-
structions.186 The exemption only applies if the broker refrains 
from providing its own information or analysis of the matters 
upon which the shareholders are being asked to vote.187 The ex-
emption has the effect of treating the broker’s function as min-
isterial, rather than a proxy solicitation. Rule 14a-2(a)(1)(ii) lim-
its a broker’s ability to obtain standing voting instructions 
because, for the exemption to apply, the broker must “furnish 
 
 179. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 
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promptly” proxy materials to the person solicited.188 By defini-
tion, the submission of SVI takes place prior to the filing of proxy 
materials, making it impossible for the broker to satisfy this re-
quirement. 
The exemption under Rule 14a-2(a)(1) does not extend to a 
broker’s own expert analysis, recommendations, or information 
on how other shareholders are voting. Brokers are permitted, 
under a different exemption, Rule 14a-2(b)(3), to furnish not just 
additional information but explicit proxy voting advice to their 
clients.189 The exemption for proxy voting advice applies as long 
as the broker provides financial advice in the ordinary course of 
business, does not receive special compensation for the advice, 
discloses any conflicts or relationships, and is not soliciting on 
behalf of any participant in the proxy contest.190 Unlike the ex-
emption under Rule 14a-2(a)(1),191 however, this provision only 
exempts the broker from the filing requirements and the obliga-
tion to furnish a proxy statement.192 As a result, a broker who 
provides advice pursuant to this exemption faces some regula-
tory risk; the broker could be liable under Rule 14a-9 for proxy 
fraud.193  
Rule 14a-4(d) also limits a broker’s ability to ask for SVI.194 
Rule 14a-4(d) does not permit a proxy to confer voting authority 
“with respect to more than one meeting” or for “any annual meet-
ing other than the next annual meeting . . . to be held after the 
date on which the proxy statement and form of proxy are first 
sent or given to security holders.”195 An SVI platform would re-
quire a change in the rule to allow customers to submit voting 
instructions prior to the distribution of the proxy statement. SVI 
would also require an amendment to Rule 14a-4(d) to authorize 
 
 188. The broker must “[f ]urnish[ ] promptly to the person solicited (or such 
person’s household in accordance with § 240.14a-3(e)(1)) a copy of all soliciting 
material with respect to the same subject matter or meeting received from all 
persons who shall furnish copies thereof for such purpose . . . .” Id. § 240.14a-
2(a)(1)(ii). 
 189. Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(3). The rule limits the exemption to those with whom 
the broker has a business relationship. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Rule 14a-2(a)(1) provides exemptions from §§ 240.14a-3 to -15. Id. 
§ 240.14a-2(a)(1). 
 192. Exemptions under Rule 14a-2(b) are limited to §§ 240.14a-3 to -6 (other 
than -6(g) and -6(p)), -8, -10, and -12 to -15. Id. § 240.14a-2(b). 
 193. Id. § 240.14a-9. 
 194. Id. § 240.14a-4(d). 
 195. Id. § 240.14a-4(d)(2)–(3). 
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voting instructions that would apply to multiple shareholders’ 
meetings. 
Only very modest changes to these provisions would be re-
quired to permit brokers to solicit SVI from their customers. The 
SEC would have to broaden the exemption under Rule 14a-2 to 
permit brokers to solicit SVI, to enable them to do so in advance 
of the distribution of the proxy statement, and to provide infor-
mation in addition to the materials that are distributed by the 
issuer and any other soliciting party. A broader exemption under 
Regulation 14A might not be sufficient, however, in that it would 
merely allow, but not compel, brokers to accept SVI and, as noted 
above, brokers have shown limited interest in facilitating retail 
voting in the absence of affirmative regulatory obligations or fi-
nancial incentives. Consequently, the SEC should go further in 
enabling efficient retail investor voting by amending Regulation 
14A to require custodial brokers to provide investors with access 
to an Internet-voting platform. Specifically, custodial brokers 
should be required to provide their retail clients with compara-
ble functionality to that available to institutional investors, in-
cluding the ability to submit voting instructions through the bro-
ker’s website and the ability to provide SVI.196  
Amending Regulation 14A to require an effective internet-
based system for retail voting would have several advantages 
over the current system. First, it would overcome existing broker 
reluctance to establishing EBIPs and provide all investors with 
access to voting platforms. Second, requiring that brokers permit 
SVI would alleviate potential concerns that brokers may cur-
rently face about their liability exposure if they deviate from ex-
isting practices.197 Third, by addressing these issues explicitly, 
 
 196. Alternatively, the SEC could eliminate the pass-through nature of ex-
isting Regulation 14A by requiring intermediaries to execute proxies giving ben-
eficial owners the right to vote their shares directly. This would enable benefi-
cial owners to cast their votes directly or use of an Internet-based intermediary 
like Moxy Vote. See Rulemaking Petition, supra note 92, at 14 (“Providing the 
right to vote to the beneficial owner would simplify the voting and vote tabula-
tion process, and would enable those companies using Internet voting systems 
for record holders to extend that system to all beneficial owners.”). By obligating 
brokers to execute such proxies, this regulatory change would enable market 
participants to compete over the development of voting platforms in the same 
way that market competition has produced multiple options for institutional 
investors. 
 197. Recall that the SEC stated in its Proxy Plumbing Release in 2010 that 
the proxy rules do not contain an exemption permitting SVI. Proxy Plumbing 
Release, supra note 103, at 84. 
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the regulation could include appropriate safeguards to protect 
investors. This Article will consider those safeguards in Part IV. 
Despite these advantages, and despite the fact that SVI pro-
posals have been before the SEC for more than ten years, the 
SEC has failed to make the necessary changes even to permit 
SVI, much less to encourage it. The SEC’s failure to act appears 
to be based on several concerns. As noted earlier,198 in 2009, the 
SEC identified the concern that SVI would enable investors to 
make their voting decisions before receiving the federally-man-
dated proxy disclosures.199 This, in turn, might lead sharehold-
ers to make their voting decisions in a generic fashion, without 
reference to the firm-specific context in which those instructions 
are being applied. This is likely to lead at least some investors to 
rely on rules of thumb or heuristics. Investors using SVI might 
also rely to a substantial degree on third-party voting recommen-
dations or policies, especially policies formulated by governance 
intermediaries such as proxy advisory firms. 
These concerns reflect a common theme—the prospect that 
SVI will promote uninformed voting by shareholders. At the 
2015 SEC Roundtable, Allan Beller succinctly identified unin-
formed voting as the key obstacle to the implementation of SVI: 
“there is a tension between providing a system that encourages 
retail investors to vote and the promotion of informed voting.”200 
In the next Part, this Article challenges the claim that the risk 
of uninformed voting is an appropriate basis for failing to imple-
ment SVI for retail investors. In Part IV, the Article offers some 
preliminary suggestions about the appropriate safeguards for 
such implementation. 
III.  SVI AND UNINFORMED SHAREHOLDER VOTING   
This Article argues that the risk of uninformed voting is a 
red herring—an insufficient basis for the SEC to continue to 
deny retail investors a functional voting platform that includes 
the capacity for SVI. The concern about uninformed voting is 
misplaced for four reasons. First, uninformed voting by retail in-
vestors is unlikely. Second, existing regulations are inconsistent 
with the voting rights conferred on investors by state law. Third, 
SVI is not in tension with the mandatory disclosure regime pro-
vided by federal law. Finally, institutional investors currently 
 
 198. See supra Part I.B. 
 199. Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91, at 33,302. 
 200. 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 26, at 129. 
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have access to SVI, and the differences between retail and insti-
tutional investors do not warrant different treatment. 
A. RETAIL INVESTORS ARE UNLIKELY TO ENGAGE IN 
UNINFORMED VOTING 
Uninformed voting is, assuredly, undesirable. If sharehold-
ers lack adequate information about the issues on which they 
vote, they may make mistakes and be vulnerable to exploitation. 
The economic rationale for shareholder voting rights is based on 
the theory that, as residual claimants, shareholders have the in-
centive to make discretionary decisions in a way that will max-
imize firm value.201 If shareholders do not vote in an informed 
manner, they may not maximize firm value through their voting 
decisions. This behavior has the potential to impose costs not 
only on shareholders, but also on other stakeholders and society 
at large. 
Berle and Means famously recognized that dispersed public 
shareholders faced collective-action costs that limit their ability 
to use their voting rights effectively.202 For small investors, it is 
rational to be apathetic about voting—the typical retail investor 
may lack a sufficient stake to warrant the investment of time 
necessary to make a fully-informed decision. Rational apathy is, 
of course, not a by-product of SVI. Nonetheless, because SVI 
gives shareholders the opportunity to designate their voting 
preferences in advance and across all their holdings, its availa-
bility could reduce the incentive for shareholders to research a 
particular vote at a specific issuer.  
There is, nonetheless, a substantial gap between theory and 
practice. Simply put, the risk that retail investors will engage in 
uninformed voting is overstated. There are several reasons for 
this. First, and most importantly, retail investors have skin in 
the game. As owners, retail shareholders have a meaningful eco-
nomic stake in the companies in which they invest. It is far more 
likely that shareholders who do not believe themselves to be suf-
ficiently informed will withhold their vote, rather than cast an 
uninformed vote that might risk damaging their economic stake. 
In contrast, most institutional votes are cast by agents or inter-
mediaries, introducing the potential for conflicts of interest or 
other agency costs.203  
 
 201. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991). 
 202. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 47, at 71. 
 203. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 18, at 865 (identifying the dual set of 
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Not only do retail investors have a meaningful economic in-
terest, they acquired that economic interest by making an af-
firmative decision to purchase their shares. Even if a retail in-
vestor’s stake in a voting outcome is relatively small, the 
underlying investment is likely to be economically meaningful to 
that shareholder. In addition, information acquired by the inves-
tor in connection with the trading decision also has the capacity 
to inform that investor’s voting decisions. Indeed, although re-
tail investor trading decisions may be less sophisticated, they are 
likely to be more information-based than a substantial propor-
tion of institutional decisions that are made on the basis of index 
composition, benchmarks, or trading algorithms.204  
Second, the use of SVI is not inconsistent with investor use 
of and reliance on federally-mandated disclosures. As discussed 
in Part IV, this Article’s proposal for SVI would retain the re-
quirement that brokers send a full set of proxy material to their 
SVI clients for each meeting, at the same time they distribute 
those proxy materials to their other clients. It would also require 
that brokers provide clients with the opportunity to override the 
standing instructions at any time and to notify clients of their 
right to do so in connection with every shareholder meeting. Ac-
cordingly, customers would retain the ability to use the feder-
ally-mandated disclosure to change or reaffirm any voting in-
structions that they had previously submitted. 
Third, the proxy statement is not the only relevant source of 
information with respect to voting decisions. Shareholders today 
have access to substantial and timely information about issuers 
and voting issues. As noted above, shareholders have access to 
information in connection with their trading decisions and have 
some level of familiarity of the issuers at which they are being 
asked to cast votes, by virtue of having voluntarily invested in 
those companies. Issuer information is available on the Internet 
and is disseminated through an increasing number of analysts, 
websites, and service providers. Retail investors can access the 
voting guidelines of mutual funds and the voting policies of many 
 
agency relationships presented by institutional investor involvement in corpo-
rate governance). 
 204. See Dan Li & Geng Li, Are Household Investors Noise Traders? Evidence 
from Belief Dispersion and Stock Trading Volume, 19, 30 (Fed. Reserve Bd. 
Working Paper No. 2014-35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2438025 (presenting data that trading by household investors is belief- and 
information-based and contributes to market efficiency). 
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other institutional investors, and can use that information to for-
mulate their own voting policies.205 Business and financial me-
dia provide extensive coverage of shareholder voting issues, and 
recent economic studies demonstrate the influence of media cov-
erage on voting outcomes.206 
Finally, increased levels of retail participation in the voting 
process will create an incentive for participants in an election to 
reach out and communicate with retail investors. Proxy solicita-
tion firms have a variety of tools available to enable issuers and 
challengers to communicate their views to a retail-investor base. 
The use of such tools is far more likely to generate an informed 
vote than the existing system of notifying an investor of the on-
line availability of a complex proxy statement.207 Today, because 
of the low levels of retail voting, participants in the proxy solici-
tation process have little reason to provide information to retail 
investors beyond filing the federally-mandated proxy statement, 
a document which, after the adoption of e-proxy, is generally not 
even provided to shareholders directly.208 If retail voting is more 
efficient, retail investors are more likely to vote their shares, 
and, in turn, participants in an election will have greater reasons 
to seek to inform those votes. 
 
 205. SEC rules require mutual funds to disclose their votes and voting poli-
cies publicly. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2017). See, e.g., Vanguard’s Proxy Voting 
Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/ 
voting-guidelines (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing Vanguard’s voting pol-
icies). DOL Regulations impose similar requirements on public pension funds. 
See, e.g., California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Statement of Invest-
ment Policy for Global Governance, (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/ 
docs/forms-publications/global-principles-corporate-governance.pdf (describing 
CalPERS voting policy). 
 206. See, e.g., Reggy Hooghiemstra, Yu Flora Kuang & Bo Qin, Say-on-Pay 
Votes: The Role of the Media, 24 EUR. ACCT. REV. 753 (2015) (reporting that 
negative media coverage of CEO pay is associated with say-on-pay voting dis-
sent in the UK); Reena Aggarwal, Isil Erel & Laura Starks, Influence of Public 
Opinion on Investor Voting and Proxy Advisors 21–22 (Fisher Coll. of Bus. 
Working Paper No. 2014-03-12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2447012 (finding that public opinion, as reflected in media 
coverage, influences both proxy advisor recommendations and voting outcomes). 
 207. See A Short-List of Incentives That Might Get More Folks to Vote Their 
Proxies, SHAREHOLDER SERVICE OPTIMIZER (2011), https://www 
.optimizeronline.com/article/101670/a-short-list-of-incentives-that-might-get 
-more-folks-to-vote-their-proxies (discussing how mailing a full package of 
proxy materials is more likely to get retail investors to vote). 
 208. Lynch, supra note 82. 
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B. STATE LAW VOTING RIGHTS ARE NOT CONDITIONED ON 
INFORMED VOTING 
Although federal law regulates the mechanics of share-
holder voting, state corporate law is the primary source of share-
holders’ substantive voting rights.209 Indeed, the original ra-
tionale for federal proxy regulation was to restore to 
shareholders the ability to exercise their state-conferred voting 
rights when shareholder dispersion threatened their ability to 
do so effectively.210  
State law does not, however, require that shareholders cast 
an informed vote. Indeed, state law imposes few restrictions on 
the motive or intent underlying the exercise of shareholder vot-
ing power. Delaware courts, for example, have explicitly recog-
nized a shareholder’s right to act selfishly in exercising its voting 
power.211 Similarly, the courts have explained that shareholders 
may validly determine how to vote their shares “by whim or ca-
price.”212  
Shareholder voting power is not conditioned upon share-
holder-specific characteristics, such as a shareholder’s inde-
pendence, intent, or good faith.213 Delaware corporate law even 
allows shareholders to sell their voting rights to someone else.214 
Shareholders do not act as fiduciaries when they exercise their 
 
 209. Federal law has, to some extent, supplemented shareholders’ state law 
voting rights. The most obvious example is the federally-mandated advisory 
vote on executive compensation. See Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why 
Congress Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 752 
(2013) (discussing say-on-pay). 
 210. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Ac-
cess, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 453 (2012) (“The federal proxy rules were designed to 
replicate, as nearly as possible, an in-person shareholder meeting.”). 
 211. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996) (citing DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1996)) (affirming controlling shareholder ’s right to vote 
based on own self-interest in a transaction requiring shareholder approval to 
sell substantially all of a corporation’s assets). 
 212. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 
A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (“Generally speaking, a shareholder may exercise wide 
liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it is not objectionable that 
his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by whims or caprice, so 
long as he violates no duty owed his fellow shareholders.”); accord Bershad v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987). 
 213. See Fisch, supra note 210, at 455 (“State law does not condition the ex-
ercise of voting power on shareholder-specific characteristics.”). 
 214. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CIV.A. 19513, 2002 WL 549137, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2002) (“Shareholders are free to do whatever they want 
with their votes, including selling them to the highest bidder.”). 
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voting rights,215 and they are under no obligation to vote their 
shares in the best interests of the corporation.216 
Although shareholders have occasionally faced challenges 
for acting selfishly when exercising their voting rights, those 
cases typically involve controlling shareholders acting on behalf 
of the corporation, rather than purely in their capacity as share-
holders.217 Even in those cases, courts have recognized that, 
while a controlling shareholder may not use the corporate ma-
chinery to gain an advantage at the expense of the minority, 
even controlling shareholders may nonetheless act out of self-
interest in both voting and selling their stock.218 
Although the failure of state law to oversee the manner in 
which shareholders exercise their voting power may seem prob-
lematic, it is premised on two considerations—the shareholders’ 
economic stake, which aligns their voting decisions with the ob-
jective of maximizing firm value, and the balance of authority 
between boards and shareholders which limits the scope of 
shareholder voting power.219 Shareholder voting is, at best, a 
weak tool for constraining board and management power, and 
 
 215. See, e.g., Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 
1977), overruled by Weinburger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (quoting 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 2031 (perm. ed., rev. vol 1976)) (“At a stockholders’ meeting, 
each stockholder represents himself and his own interests solely and in no sense 
acts as a trustee or representative of others . . . .”); see also Bershad, 535 A.2d 
at 845 (“Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right to control and vote 
their shares in their own interest.”). 
 216. Concededly, state law recognizes that “[w]hat legitimizes the stock-
holder vote as a decision-making mechanism is the premise that stockholders 
with economic ownership are expressing their collective view as to whether a 
particular course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth max-
imization.” Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 997 A.2d 377 (Del. 
2010).  
 217. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist 
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1269 (2008) (observing that the circum-
stances in which courts have imposed fiduciary duties on shareholders have 
been limited both to controlling shareholders and to cases involving “corporate 
‘freeze-outs’ and closely held corporations”). 
 218. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124 (even a controlling “stockholder in a Delaware 
corporation” has the right “to vote [his shares] in his own interest”), rev’d on 
other grounds, 457 A.2d 701; Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1380–81 (Del. 
1996) (“Stockholders (even a controlling stockholder bloc) may properly vote in 
their own economic interest . . . .”). 
 219. See Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corpo-
rate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 35–36) (on 
file with author) (identifying the rationale for limiting shareholder power in fa-
vor of director primacy). 
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imposing conditions on the exercise of that power is likely to evis-
cerate its effectiveness. Moreover, questions about the ability of 
shareholders to exercise their voting power intelligently are 
more properly addressed to the substantive scope of shareholder 
voting rights than to the manner in which those rights are exer-
cised.220 
C. UNINFORMED SHAREHOLDER ACTION IS NOT IN TENSION 
WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
In contrast to state corporate law, the disclosure orientation 
of the federal securities laws prioritizes the goal of informed 
shareholder action. The very rationale of a mandatory disclosure 
system is to protect investors by giving them sufficient infor-
mation relevant to their trading and voting decisions.221 Federal 
law requires the disclosure of specified information in a variety 
of circumstances. Issuers are required to file a registration state-
ment and prospectus prior to selling securities to the public.222 
After going public, issuers are required to make periodic disclo-
sures to keep investors informed, including an annual report.223 
In addition, anyone who solicits proxies from shareholders is re-
quired to comply with the proxy-solicitation requirements of 
Regulation 14A, which include the preparation of a proxy state-
ment.224  
One objective of this disclosure is to facilitate informed 
shareholder action.225 Federal law does not actually require, 
however, that shareholders be informed. Rather, the obligation 
is on issuers to disclose, not on investors to use that disclosure.226 
The principle behind the federal disclosure system is to require 
that the mandated disclosure be sent to each investor, not that 
 
 220. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 209, at 753–54 (identifying limitations on 
shareholders’ ability to cast an intelligent “say-on-pay” vote). 
 221. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload 
and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 431 
(2003) (“Disclosure is merely the chosen means to the end of informed investor 
decision making.”). 
 222. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b)(1), (g)(1), m, o(d) 
(2012). 
 224. Id. § 78n(a). 
 225. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 221, at 462 (“Informed investor decision 
making [is] a key goal of the federal securities laws, probably the main goal 
today.”). 
 226. Cf. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based 
Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2000) (proposing instead the elimination 
of issuer-based regulatory requirements in favor of investor regulation). 
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each investor read it, acknowledge that they have read it, or 
demonstrate his or her familiarity with its contents prior to in-
vesting or voting. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, modern investors are un-
likely to read the federally-mandated disclosure documents. The 
length and complexity of the proxy statement and supporting 
documents continues to increase. For example, Jeffrey Gordon 
observed that the average length of an annual report increased 
from approximately sixteen pages in 1950 to 165 in 2004.227 A 
similar increase has occurred in the length of proxy state-
ments.228 Not only has the documentation increased in length, 
but shareholders are asked to vote on an increasing number of 
issues.229  
As a result, many investors never read the federally-man-
dated disclosures.230 As Troy Paredes explains, the existing dis-
closure regime is too extensive and complex, and, as a result, 
“few people expect the ‘average’ individual investor to focus in 
any detail on the information that companies disclose.”231 Simi-
larly, a 2006 survey by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) 
reported that only one-third of mutual-fund investors consulted 
the prospectus before purchasing their shares and that most in-
vestors do not use the SEC-mandated disclosure documents to 
monitor their investments.232 
The SEC’s concern about SVI reducing shareholder use of 
the mandated disclosure is also in tension with other regulatory 
reforms that have reduced shareholder access to the disclosures 
and made it easier to vote without reading them. As noted above, 
for example, the introduction of e-proxy meant that investors 
 
 227. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1465, 1547 (2007). The average length of an annual report continues to 
increase; see also Vipal Monga & Emily Chasan, The 109,894-Word Annual Re-
port, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2015, at B10 (reporting that GE’s 2013 annual report 
was 246 pages long and that the average annual report in 2013 was about 
42,000 words). 
 228. See, e.g., Kastiel & Nili, supra note 27, at 69 (citing the example of the 
Apple proxy statement, which grew from eighteen pages in 1994 to ninety in 
2004). 
 229. Id. at 68. 
 230. Cf. Stephen Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public 
Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 118 (2006) (“Most individual investors 
are likely not to read the prospectus even if delivered to them.”). 
 231. Paredes, supra note 221, at 431–32. 
 232. See INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MU-
TUAL FUND INFORMATION 22 (2006), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_ 
full.pdf. 
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must affirmatively seek out the disclosure materials, rather 
than receiving them automatically.233 Similarly, the SEC allows 
shareholders to submit voting instructions on their mobile de-
vices.234 These actions arguably increase the risk that sharehold-
ers will vote without reading the lengthy proxy statement. 
This is not to say that the federally-mandated disclosure 
system is a failure. The system works because the disclosures 
are made to the market, and some market participants incorpo-
rate that information into trading prices by relying on that in-
formation. This enables the rest of the investing public to free-
ride—relying on the market price set by better-informed inves-
tors.235 In addition, issuer disclosures are “largely ‘filtered’ 
through experts—various securities professionals and financial 
intermediaries—who research and process the information and 
whose trades and recommendations ultimately set securities 
prices.”236 Developments in technology have dramatically in-
creased the market’s ability to process and disseminate infor-
mation, meaning that the average investor reaps the benefit of 
issuer disclosures today through an ever-growing number of In-
ternet and social-media sources. 
That federal law expressly vests investors with discretion to 
choose which and how much information to use is reflected in the 
SEC’s 2005 Public Offering Reforms.237 In the reforms, the SEC 
shifted the disclosure requirement in the registration process 
from that of providing investors with disclosure, to instead 
providing investors with access—that is, making the disclosure 
available.238 The access-equals-delivery system treats issuers as 
having delivered the mandated disclosures to investors once 
 
 233. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing e-proxy). 
 234. See, e.g., Letter from John G. Strumpf, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, 
Wells Fargo & Co., to Stockholders (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www08 
.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2016 
-proxy-statement.pdf (advising shareholders that they can vote their shares us-
ing their mobile devices). 
 235. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014) 
(quoting Amgen Inc., v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013)) 
(“It is reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they have little 
hope of outperforming the market in the long run based solely on their analysis 
of publicly available information—will rely on the security’s market price as an 
unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.”). 
 236. Paredes, supra note 221, at 431–32. 
 237. Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,731–32 (Aug. 3, 
2005). 
 238. See Choi, supra note 230, at 102–04 (evaluating the effect of shifting 
from delivery to access). 
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those disclosures are made publicly available.239 The result of 
the system, however, is that investors are left with the choice of 
whether to access the applicable disclosure documents, and need 
not affirm that they have read them before purchasing securi-
ties.  
D. ALLOWING SVI FOR INSTITUTIONAL BUT NOT RETAIL 
INVESTORS IS NOT WARRANTED 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the SEC’s current 
regulations have the practical effect of enabling institutional, 
but not retail, investors to utilize SVI. The risk of uninformed 
voting is not unique to retail investors, however. The same con-
cern might be raised about institutional investor voting. 
The regulatory changes adopted by the DOL and the SEC to 
mandate institutional voting impose a duty on institutional in-
vestors to vote, but institutions do not necessarily cast that vote 
in an informed manner. Indeed, commentators frequently criti-
cize institutional investors for “blindly” relying on proxy advi-
sors,240 and policymakers have sought to impose greater regula-
tory restrictions on advisors with the objective of compelling a 
more informed institutional vote.241 The mechanism for doing so 
is unclear, however. Many institutions lack the sophistication 
and resources to vote in an informed manner. Investment advi-
sors may be expert in designing investment strategies but lack 
competence in evaluating governance issues. Some institutions, 
such as index funds, compete by minimizing their operating ex-
penses, and devoting substantial resources to governance re-
search may be in tension with that business model. In addition, 
institutional investors are subject to agency costs—those who 
are making voting decisions do not, as a general rule, have an 
economic interest in the securities that they are voting. 
 
 239. See Rules 153, 172, 173, 174, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.153, .172, .173, .174 
(2017). 
 240. See, e.g., Daniel Gallagher, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks at Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals, 
http://sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539700301 (July 11, 2013) (“The 
last thing we should want is for investment advisers to adopt a mindset that 
leads to them blindly casting their votes in line with a proxy advisor ’s recom-
mendations, especially given the fact that such recommendations are often not 
tailored to a fund’s unique strategy or investment goals.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Bonnie Barsamian & Marc Leaf, Proxy Advisory Firms in the 
Regulatory Spotlight, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
869646/proxy-advisory-firms-in-the-regulatory-spotlight (discussing proposed 
regulation of proxy advisory firms). 
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Commentators have suggested that institutional investors 
are better positioned to research and develop voting policies than 
retail investors, and it is certainly true that some institutional 
investors, such as Blackrock and Vanguard, devote substantial 
resources to voting research.242 Both institutional and retail in-
vestors vary tremendously, however, and it is likely that a sub-
stantial percentage of retail investors who invest directly in com-
mon stock are at least as sophisticated as the advisors to many 
smaller pension and mutual funds. In short, the difference be-
tween retail and institutional investors, with respect to both 
their ability and their willingness to make informed voting deci-
sions, is overstated. 
Even the claim that retail investors are less sophisticated 
than institutions is likely overstated. Wealthy, better-educated, 
and more sophisticated households are most likely to invest in 
the stock market in general,243 and, within the overall popula-
tion of retail investors, are more likely to own stock directly, as 
opposed to mutual fund shares.244 This pattern has increased re-
cently, as unsophisticated households have reduced their invest-
ment in equity.245 
It is possible, of course, that the opportunity to submit SVI 
will encourage retail investors to be lazy. It is also possible that 
institutional investors have structures and internal controls that 
enable them to oversee the mechanics of the SVI process more 
 
 242. See, e.g., Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street 
Bulk up Governance Staff, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a (describing expansions in the 
size of corporate governance teams at Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street). 
 243. Robert Frank, The Stock Gap: American Stock Holdings at 18-year Low, 
CNBC (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/08/the-stock-gap-american 
-stock-holdings-at-18-year-low.html (“[In] 2010, the latest period available, the 
top 10 percent of Americans by net worth held 81 percent of all directly held or 
indirectly held stocks.”). 
 244. See Li, supra note 204, at 24 (“[P]rime-age, better educated, white, and 
higher-income consumers should have a more pronounced effect on stock trad-
ing volume.”); see also Daniel Barth, The Costs and Beliefs Implied by Direct 
Stock Ownership 9 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1657, 2014) (an-
alyzing data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and Household Wealth and 
finding that wealthy households are relatively more likely to own individual 
stocks, hold an increased number of individual stocks and allocate more of their 
household wealth to equity). 
 245. See, e.g., Marcin Kacperczyk, Jaromir Nosal & Luminita Stevens, In-
vestor Sophistication and Capital Income Inequality 4 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (“Over time, unsophisticated households in-
crease their share of liquid, money-like instruments and shift away from direct 
stock ownership and ownership of intermediated products, such as actively 
managed equity mutual funds.”). 
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effectively and to identify situations in which it is in their inter-
ests to override their standing instructions. Even institutions, 
however, can make stupid mistakes in casting their votes. Re-
cently, for example, T. Rowe Price failed to override its comput-
erized voting system and mistakenly voted its shares in favor of 
the 2013 Dell merger, even though the funds’ advisors believed 
the merger price was too low.246 By voting in favor, the funds 
were disqualified from exercising their appraisal rights, an error 
that cost them $194 million.247 
IV.  IMPLEMENTATION OF SVI   
Implementation of SVI raises a variety of practical consid-
erations. There is the question of the manner in which brokers 
should solicit SVI. Should brokers be required to ask every cus-
tomer for SVI or is it sufficient if brokers give their customers 
the opportunity to do so? Should third party providers be permit-
ted to offer retail investors the opportunity to access internet 
sites that enable them to submit SVI? Should brokers be re-
quired to cooperate with third-party providers? 
A second question concerns the types of instructions that 
customers should be permitted to submit. A voting platform 
could provide investors with a limited number of choices, such as 
the four choices proposed by Steve Norman—voting with the 
board recommendation, voting against the board recommenda-
tion, voting proportionately with other shareholders, or abstain-
ing.248 This range of choices would be very simple to implement, 
as evidenced by Broadridge’s one-click button.249 
A platform could also provide investors with a broader set of 
options, such as, allowing investors to cast their votes in the 
same way that another designated investor, in the way a mutual 
fund or public pension fund votes its shares. An investor might, 
for example, choose to vote their shares in the same way as Van-
guard’s S&P 500 index fund. This option is similar to the manner 
in which institutional investors currently have the ability to di-
rect their votes to be cast in accordance with the recommenda-
tions of a proxy advisor, such as ISS or Glass Lewis. 
 
 246. Sarah Krouse, T. Rowe Price Pays Up for Botched Vote, WALL ST. J. 
(June 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-price-to-reimburse-clients 
-194-million-for-dell-deal-flub-1465244254. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.  
 249. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing one-click but-
ton). 
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Because this approach would result in the investor essen-
tially delegating voting authority to a third party, it raises ques-
tions about the extent to which such delegations are appropriate. 
Institutional investors have been highly criticized for delegating 
their voting decisions to proxy advisory firms.250 Delegating vot-
ing authority, however, raises fewer concerns in the context of 
retail investors. First, retail investors who lack the interest or 
expertise to analyze voting decisions carefully may rationally 
view institutions as more knowledgeable. Second, a retail inves-
tor’s decision to delegate voting authority to a large institutional 
investor with skin in the game is very different from an institu-
tion’s decision to delegate to a proxy advisor who is not subject 
to the disciplinary forces of an underlying economic interest.251 
Third, retail investors who delegate voting authority are acting 
as principals, rather than fiduciaries, with respect to their voting 
decision. 
More complex SVI options would allow investors to desig-
nate issue-specific voting policies or guidelines, such as voting 
against classified boards, in favor of separating the chair and 
CEO, or against overboarded directors. The mechanism by which 
investors designate such preferences would, of necessity, be 
more complex. Nonetheless, the systems available to institu-
tional investors allow these types of designations. An even more 
complex menu might enable investors to set up screens which 
would operate to direct the investors’ vote in accordance with 
specified criteria—such as voting in accordance with manage-
ment recommendations unless the screen flags a problem like 
underperformance or poor corporate governance. 
A third question concerns the type of information that 
should be available on a voting platform. This Article argues 
that, at a minimum, a retail voting platform should enable an 
investor to designate SVI for all the investor’s security holdings 
and to access the proxy statement, proxy card, and annual re-
 
 250. See Gallagher, supra note 240; see also David Larcker & Allan McCall, 
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 
203 (2015) (“The outsourcing of voting to proxy advisory firms appears to have 
the unintended economic consequence that boards of directors are induced to 
make choices that decrease shareholder value.”). 
 251. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law 
and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 
688 (2005) (criticizing the influence of proxy advisors that have no “skin in the 
game”). 
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port, as well as any other soliciting material, when those docu-
ments become available.252 Platform providers may find, how-
ever, that investors want to obtain additional information. Pro-
viders could collect and include, as ProxyDemocracy does, the 
pre-announced votes of institutional investors.253 Providers 
could include the published voting guidelines of major institu-
tional investors or of the proxy advisory firms. They could also 
include links to research concerning corporate governance is-
sues, or media reports concerning specific issuers or voting is-
sues. The broader the scope of this information, the more the 
voting platform can serve as a single source for informing inves-
tors. 
Resolving questions about the best way to implement SVI is 
complex. This Article argues, however, that it is neither neces-
sary nor desirable for the SEC to address these questions or to 
determine the ideal structure for a retail voting platform.254 In-
stead, the Article suggests that existing market forces will ena-
ble service providers to experiment with voting platforms, based 
on investor demand for these options and the cost of providing 
them. Rather than concern itself with identifying an ideal proto-
col in adopting its regulations, the SEC should limit itself to re-
moving the existing regulatory impediments and implementing 
minimal safeguards to prevent abuse. These safeguards should 
 
 252. In an ideal world, the voting platform would populate the voting options 
with the precise language contained in the proxy, when that language becomes 
available. 
 253. CalPERS publishes its voting decisions in advance of the shareholders’ 
meeting in an explicit attempt to encourage other shareholders to vote the same 
way. See Key Decisions, CALPERS, https://calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/ 
governance/proxy-voting/key-decisions (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (“We publish 
our proxy voting decisions to encourage shareowners to vote in accordance with 
CalPERS. These votes are for informational purposes only and not intended as 
investment advice.”). 
 254. Because voting platforms can be implemented in conjunction with bro-
kers’ existing websites, as Broadridge has done with EBPs, it is unnecessary to 
impose a separate registration requirement on the voting platform itself. To the 
extent that non-brokers seek to establish stand-alone voting platforms, the SEC 
may consider whether to require them to register as broker-dealers or invest-
ment advisers. It is worth noting that, under current law, proxy advisory firms 
do not have to register with the SEC, although legislation has been proposed to 
require such registration. See, e.g., Ed Batts, Yet Another Congressional Pro-
posed Corporate Reform: Proxy Advisory Firms in the Crosshairs, HARV. L. SCH.: 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 20, 2016), https://corpgov.law 
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-proxy-advisory-firms-in-the-crosshairs (describing “the Proxy Advisory Reform 
Act of 2016”). 
 2017] STANDING VOTING INSTRUCTIONS 57 
 
be implemented through regulation of broker-dealers who per-
mit customers to establish SVI and through regulation of inter-
mediaries who provide a proxy-voting platform.255 
With respect to the manner of implementing SVI, SEC reg-
ulations should mandate that any communication to a share-
holder clearly disclose that the SVI instructions can be revoked 
at any time prior to the shareholder meeting, that the SEC has 
mandated specific disclosures in connection with a shareholder 
vote, and that shareholders should read those disclosures before 
deciding whether to adhere to their pre-designated instructions. 
Investors who have established SVI should continue to receive 
notice of all proxy communications in the same manner as other 
shareholders. To facilitate easy access to the SEC-mandated dis-
closures in connection with the voting decision, the SEC should 
require proxy-voting platforms to post or provide links to the dis-
closures as soon as they are available.256 In addition, SEC regu-
lations should provide for the proxy voting platform to notify its 
customers in advance of the annual meeting of each issuer in 
which they own stock. The notice should alert investors about 
the upcoming shareholder vote, advise them how their shares 
will be voted based on their existing instructions, explain how 
they can change that vote if they so desire, and inform investors 
of the final deadline for submitting or changing voting instruc-
tions with respect to this meeting. 
With respect to the SVI options, the SEC’s primary focus 
should be to require that they are evenhanded and transparent. 
 
 255. This structure is analogous to the regulatory structure established by 
Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) with 
respect to crowdfunding. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 315–23 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Specifically, the JOBS Act allows 
crowdfunded securities to be sold either by a registered broker-dealer or through 
a registered crowdfunding portal. See Lori Smith, Bridget Henwood & Michael 
Psathas, Regulating the Gatekeepers: The Regulatory Scheme for Funding Por-
tals in Crowdfunding Offerings, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Regulating-the-Gatekeepers-The 
-Regulatory-Scheme-for-Funding-Portals-in-Crowdfunding-Offerings.html; see 
also Shekhar Darke, Note, To Be or Not to Be a Funding Portal: Why Crowd-
funding Platforms Will Become Broker-Dealers, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 183 
(2014) (arguing that providers will prefer to register as broker-dealers); cf. 
Smith et al., supra (explaining SEC rules implement a variety of safeguards 
applicable to crowdfunding platforms).  
 256. Currently this is a substantial deficiency in Proxyvote.com. Although 
the site includes a hyperlink to the proxy statement, the webpage itself lacks 
complete information on the issues for which voting instructions are sought and 
investors who access the proxy statement through the hyperlink risk timing out 
on the voting platform. 
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Thus, if a platform contains a vote-with-management button, it 
should also offer investors the option to vote against manage-
ment. If the platform allows investors to vote in accordance with 
the votes or guidelines of other investors, it should provide in-
vestors with those guidelines and/or the investors’ past voting 
record. In addition, the site should not contain any language that 
suggests or endorses a particular vote or voting policy.257 
The SEC’s policy with respect to permitting platforms to 
provide additional information is perhaps the most difficult is-
sue, because the SEC has long taken the view that someone who 
provides information to investors has endorsed the information 
provided and may be liable if that information is inaccurate or 
incomplete.258 In addition, the SEC may be wary of encouraging 
platforms to provide links to information that is one-sided, un-
verified, or has the potential to mislead investors. Here, how-
ever, the SEC’s regulatory approach may need to reflect the re-
ality that investors already have access to this information 
through the Internet and that the collection or aggregation of 
publicly-sourced information should not expose a platform to li-
ability unless that information is modified or skewed. With re-
spect to issues of distortion or bias, the SEC’s approach should 
focus on the incentives for such distortion, rather than the pro-
vision of information. 
Toward that end, perhaps the most significant safeguard 
that the SEC can impose is a requirement that voting platforms 
be free of conflicts of interest. The fundamental principles un-
derlying this requirement are already contained in the proxy 
rules, which distinguish those with an interest in the outcome of 
a shareholder vote or a relationship with the participants from 
 
 257. Issuers and institutional investors will have ample incentives to moni-
tor platforms and report instances of potential distortion or bias to the SEC, 
which can address such conduct by using Rule 14a-9. Notably, Rule 14a-9 ap-
plies to prohibit proxy fraud even with respect to proxy solicitations that are 
otherwise exempt from the proxy statement and filing requirements of Regula-
tion 14A. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2017). 
 258. Indeed, the SEC failed to exempt crowdfunding intermediaries from li-
ability for issuer fraud. See Alan Bickerstaff, Jeff C. Dodd & Ted Gilman, SEC 
Adopts Rules to Allow Crowdfunding Beginning May 16, 2016, ANDREWS 
KURTH INSIGHTS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.andrewskurth.com/insights-1284 
.html (“The SEC specifically declined to exempt funding portals (or any inter-
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4A(c).”). 
 2017] STANDING VOTING INSTRUCTIONS 59 
 
others.259 The SEC rules should prohibit a voting platform or an-
yone that maintains a voting platform from having a financial 
interest in an issuer, the subject of a shareholder vote, or a rela-
tionship to participants in an election contest. The regulations 
should designate that voting platforms can only be funded by: (1) 
issuers through the NYSE schedule under Regulation 14A or a 
substantially similar fee structure; (2) brokers that are provid-
ing the platform for the benefit of their customers; or (3) custom-
ers themselves through direct fees. The regulations should ex-
plicitly prohibit platforms from receiving any form of 
compensation from individuals or organizations who might have 
a direct or indirect interest in the subject of a shareholder vote, 
including proxy contest participants, advocacy groups, institu-
tional investors such as hedge funds, and proxy advisory firms. 
Finally, the SEC might decide that some issues are inher-
ently case-specific and inappropriate for SVI. Accordingly, the 
SEC rules might provide that a broker may not utilize SVI for 
issues such as a merger or a contested election and must instead 
provide notice to the customer at the time that the proxy state-
ment is released and solicit voting instructions. In any cases in 
which brokers are not permitted to use SVI, the rules should re-
quire them to notify SVI investors that their standing instruc-
tions do not apply and that their shares will not be voted unless 
they take action. 
The foregoing discussion offers a preliminary blueprint for 
the introduction of voting platforms and SVI for use by retail in-
vestors. The market responses to this proposal cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty, and the SEC will need to continue to mon-
itor voting platforms in the same way that it monitors the overall 
proxy solicitation process. In particular, as with other aspects of 
proxy voting, the SEC must police against bias, conflicts of inter-
est, and potential fraud. The difficulty of this task is likely to be 
minimal, however. A variety of interested participants in the 
shareholder voting process, including institutional investors, is-
suers, and investor advocates, are likely to detect and reveal po-
tential problems. 
  CONCLUSION   
Despite the increasing importance of shareholder voting, re-
tail investors have been largely excluded. Few retail investors 
 
 259. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (b)(1) (exempting certain solicitations 
from the filing and proxy statement requirements but identifying various cate-
gories of interested persons for whom the exemption does not apply). 
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vote their stock, and the mechanics of the voting process rarely 
make it rational for them to do so. This Article advocates a solu-
tion to the problem—providing retail investors with access to a 
voting platform analogous to those used by institutional inves-
tors. A voting platform that allows investors to obtain infor-
mation and cast votes with respect to all their security positions, 
submit SVI, and obtain information relevant to the voting deci-
sion would reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of the vot-
ing process. 
The biggest obstacle to regulatory changes implementing 
voting platforms and SVI is the concern that SVI would increase 
uninformed voting. As this Article has demonstrated, however, 
this risk is not specific to retail investors, nor likely to be exac-
erbated by SVI. Instead, this Article offers specific suggestions 
as to the regulatory changes required to implement SVI and the 
appropriate safeguards to protect investors. By creating the op-
portunity for market providers to meet the needs of retail inves-
tors, SVI offers the potential to bring greater legitimacy to share-
holder voting. 
